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MAKING A MARK IN THE INTERNET ECONOMY: A 




Commercial trade in the United States is undergoing a seismic shift as 
consumers flock to the Internet.  Over sixty-four million adults go online every 
month.1  They increasingly come to shop.  Online purchases jumped by more 
than 25% last year,2 and this past holiday season consumers spent over $23 
billion online.3  And if they aren’t buying, they’re browsing.  Since the World 
Wide Web’s inception in 1990, the Internet has become an essential source for 
information on products and retailers.4  Responding to the trend, corporations 
are shifting billions of advertising dollars from traditional media to the Internet. 
Last year, corporate America spent $8.7 billion on various forms of online 
advertising.5 
The explosive growth of e-commerce comes at a price.  As commercial 
websites multiply, businesses are looking for new techniques to break through 
the informational clutter.  One such technique that has received considerable 
attention is the use of Internet search engines for keyword search advertising. 
Keywords are the terms or phrases a computer user types into a search engine 
to conduct an online search.6  Keyword search advertising occurs when an 
* Deputy County Counsel, Sonoma County, California.  J.D., Yale Law School; B.A., 
Cornell University.  The author would like to thank Christine Pedigo, Matthew Schultz, and 
John Tehranian for their assistance with this article. 
1. Mediamark Research, Inc., 64.2 Million U.S. Adults Regular Internet Users, The 
Internet Economy Indicators, at http://www.internetindicators.com/facts1.html (last visited Aug. 
8, 2005). 
2. Press Release, comScore Networks, Online Holiday Spending Surges Beyond 
Expectations, Driving E-Commerce to Record Annual Sales of $117 Billion, at http://www. 
comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=546 (Jan. 10, 2005). 
3. Press Release, Nielsen//NetRatings, Online Holiday Shopping Season 2004 Hits $23.2 
Billion, Rising 25 Percent from 2003, According to the Holiday Espending Report from 
Goldman Sachs, Harris Interactive and Nielsen//NetRatings, at http://direct.www.nielsen-
netratings.com/pr/PR_050103.pdf (Jan. 3, 2004). 
4. See Rob McGann, Consumers Search Before Buying Online, at http://www.clickz. 
com/stats/sectors/retailing/article.php/3483906 (Feb. 16, 2005). 
5. John Markoff & Nat Ives, Web Search Sites See Clicks Add Up to Big Ad Dollars, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2005, at A1. 
6. Keyword, NETLINGO, at http://www.netlingo.com/lookup.cfm?term=keyword (last 







   
 
 
     













180 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  58:179 
advertiser pays a search engine to link a particular keyword to its website. 
When a search engine user types the keyword into her browser window, a link 
to the advertiser’s business appears on the search engine results page.7 
Businesses like keyword search advertising because it targets customers who 
have already expressed an interest in the businesses’ product.8  Last year,  
keyword search advertising represented more than 40% of the nearly $9 billion 
spent on Internet advertising.9 
Not every business is pleased with search engine advertising.  Keywords are 
often trademarks, and trademark owners object that the search engines are 
guilty of an insidious invasion of their trademark rights when they sell their 
trademarks as keywords without their permission.  In the mark holders’ eyes, 
permitting the use of their marks to trigger advertising by their business 
competitors is bad enough, but placing these advertisements on a page of 
supposedly accurate search engine results is the “sort of deception and 
consumer confusion [that] the trademark laws are intended to prohibit.”10 Most 
of the mark holders’ ire is directed at Google, the most widely used search 
engine in the world.11  Like other search engines, Google allows advertisers to 
bid on keywords, even if the keyword is a trademark.  The mark holders have 
filed multiple actions against Google for trademark infringement.12  The  
outcome of these pending infringement cases has enormous potential to impact 
search engines and the way corporate America spends its advertising dollars.13 
7. G. Peter Albert, Jr. & Rita A. Abbati, Metatags, Keywords, and Links: Recent 
Developments Addressing Trademark Threats in Cyberspace, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 341, 358 
(2003). 
8. See Kurt M. Saunders, Confusion Is the Key: A Trademark Law Analysis of Keyword 
Banner Advertising, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 543, 544 (2002).  Search engines are able to sell 
keyword triggered advertising at a considerably higher rate than advertising that is not targeted 
to a consumer’s particular search.  Gregory Shea, Note, Trademarks and Keyword Banner 
Advertising, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 529, 532 (2002). 
9. Markoff & Ives, supra note 5. 
10. American Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc.’s Opposition to Counter-Defendant’s and 
Third-Party Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Counterclaims and Third-Party Claims ¶ 6, Am. 
Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 2004 WL 2159673 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 17, 2004) 
(No. C 03-5340) [hereinafter Brief of American Blind]. 
11. By 2003, three-quarters of all online searches used Google or sites that used Google’s 
search results. 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 25:69, at 25-163 to -164 (4th ed. 1996). 
12. See infra Part I.B. 
13. Indeed, some contend that “use” should be defined narrowly if for no other reason than 
that the indirect effect of a broad definition would be to eliminate the revenue stream that has 
allowed search engines to provide their services to the public for free. See Stacey L. Dogan & 
Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 
777, 782 (2004). 
     
  
  
      

















181 2005] ANALYSIS OF SEARCH ENGINE ADVERTISING 
The current state of trademark law makes it impossible to predict how the 
Google cases will be resolved.  In order to succeed on a claim for trademark 
infringement, a claimant must prove that: (1) there was a “use” of the mark by 
the alleged infringer; and (2) this “use” creates a “likelihood of confusion” 
among consumers.14  While a rich body of law already maps the contours of the 
likelihood of confusion test, there is little information available to litigants as 
to what constitutes “use.”  Using the Google cases as a springboard, this article 
describes the current impoverished state of trademark “use” law and proposes 
a definition of “use” for the era of Internet commerce.  After a brief summary 
of both the requirements for proving trademark infringement and defenses 
thereto, Part II examines how courts currently define trademark use.  Although 
there has been some movement towards a definition that can meet the 
challenges of Internet commerce, the case law generally remains stuck in a 
narrow concept of trademark insufficient to meet those challenges.  Part III 
looks at the theoretical bases for trademark law.  An oft-cited rationale for 
trademark law is to reduce consumer search costs.  But because the search costs 
rationale is not an entirely satisfying justification for trademark protection, and 
it is already encompassed by the likelihood of confusion test, other theories are 
examined.  Part IV offers a new definition of “use” based on the often 
overlooked rationale that trademark law should encourage the development of 
new trademarks. This proposed definition of “use” grounded on efforts to trade 
on consumer goodwill would identify search engines like Google that sell 
advertising based on trademarked keywords as potential infringers, but only 
make them liable for infringement if their uses also confuse consumers.  Such 
a definition would encourage trademark investment, lend some much needed 
clarity to the law, and avoid the redundancy of other proposed definitions of 
“use.” 
II. The Current Landscape of Trademark Protection 
A. The Test for Trademark Infringement 
Trademark infringement in the United States is forbidden by the Lanham 
Act.15  The Lanham Act defines a trademark as any word, name, symbol, or 
device used by a person to identify and distinguish goods or services from those 
of others and to indicate the source of those goods or services.16  Sections 32 
and 43(a) of the Lanham Act prohibit trademark infringement. The former sets 
14. Karl Storz Endoscopy-Am., Inc. v. Surgical Techs., Inc., 285 F.3d 848, 853-54 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (2000). 
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). 




   
  





















182 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  58:179 
out the standard for liability for infringement of a federally registered 
trademark;17 the latter provides the standard for misuse of an unregistered 
trademark.18  These tests for infringement are substantially the same.19  They 
require a plaintiff to establish that: (1) the trademark was “used” by the 
defendant in commerce; and (2) such “use” is likely to cause confusion among 
the consuming public.20  The focus of this article is the definition of “use” — 
the first stage in the trademark infringement analysis.  Only after it has been 
determined that there has been a use in commerce should the court proceed to 
an analysis of whether there is a likelihood of confusion.21  After briefly 
sketching the way courts determine likelihood of confusion, this part examines 
case law where the definition of “use” has been at issue.  This part concludes 
with a description of “fair use,” an affirmative defense to trademark 
infringement that requires an analysis separate from the determination of “use.” 
17. Section 32 states that a party may be liable for infringement for 
use in commerce [of] any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation 
of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or 
advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is 
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. 
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000). 
18. Section 43(a) prohibits “uses in commerce [of] any word, term, name, symbol, or 
device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading 
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact” that “is likely to cause 
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of 
such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her 
goods, services, or commercial, activities by another person.”  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000). 
19. See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Action Activewear, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1060, 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991).
20. Karl Storz Endoscopy-Am., Inc. v. Surgical Techs., Inc., 285 F.3d 848, 853-54 (9th Cir. 
2002); U-Haul, Int’l v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 727 (E.D. Va. 2003).  In 
addition to demonstrating “use” and “likelihood of confusion,” a section 32 plaintiff must prove 
ownership of a registered trademark.  See Trade Media Holdings Ltd. v. Huang & Assocs., 123 
F. Supp. 2d 233, 237 (D.N.J. 2000).  For infringement of an unregistered mark, the plaintiff 
must demonstrate that the unregistered mark merits Lanham Act protection, that is, the mark 
is descriptive and possesses secondary meaning or that it is suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful. 
See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).  Suggestive 
marks are those marks that suggest a feature or characteristic of the product or service but still 
require some imagination and thought to reach a conclusion as to the nature of the product or 
service.  Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 
1968).  Arbitrary and fanciful marks are considered inherently distinctive. Abercrombie & 
Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9.  Fanciful marks are composed of made-up words such as “KODAK” 
for film.  Id.  A mark is arbitrary if the term has no direct or indirect relationship to the product 
or service in question or any of its qualities or characteristics.  See id.
21. Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 877 (6th Cir. 2002). 
   
   
 










   
   
  
     




183 2005] ANALYSIS OF SEARCH ENGINE ADVERTISING 
B. The Google Litigation 
Google is the major seller in the search engine advertising market.  It reaches 
80% of U.S. Internet users22 and accounts for one-third of all online 
advertising.23 Businesses paid $1 billion to showcase their products on Google 
in the last three months of 2004.24 “Adwords” is the name of the keyword 
search advertising program that Google offers its business customers.  Under 
the Adwords program, advertisers can purchase or bid on keywords that will 
generate an advertising link when a consumer conducts a search using that 
keyword on Google. The advertising link appears on the top, right, or left hand 
side of the screen under the heading “Sponsored Links.”25  A line separates the 
“Sponsored Links” from the rest of the search results.26  Google’s policy is to 
allow marketers to purchase trademarked words and phrases for use in the 
Adwords program.27  The Adwords program exposes the inadequacy of the 
current definition of “use” in the trademark infringement context. 
Mark holders across the world have taken issue with Google’s advertising 
system.  In France and Germany, multiple mark holders have taken on Google 
and won.  Google users typing trademarks for two French travel firms — 
“Bourse des Vols” and “Bourse des Voyages” — were offered “Sponsored 
Links” to EasyJet, a low cost rival.  The two French firms sued and were 
22. The Google Network is the largest online advertising network available, reaching over 
80% of thirty-day U.S. Internet users.  Google, Adwords, at https://adwords.google.com/support/ 
bin/answer.py?answer=6119&hl=en_US (last visited Aug. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Google, 
Adwords]. 
23. Laurence Frost, Google May Appeal Trademark Ruling, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 8, 2005, 
at Bus. 10. 
24. Markoff & Ives, supra note 5. 
25. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 701-02 (E.D. Va. 
2004); Brief of American Blind, supra note 10, ¶ 19; see also Google, Adwords, supra note 22 
(describing Adwords program).  Unlike some search engines, Google does not require an exact 
match between a search term and the purchased keyword in order to generate a result.  Instead, 
Google’s default is to automatically pair purchased keywords with other relevant words.  For 
example, if an advertiser bids on “blinds,” Google not only runs the advertisement with results 
from a search for “blinds,” but also with results for a search for “Hunter Douglas blinds.”  In 
contrast, other search engines such as Overture and Kanoodle.com default to exact matching 
so that an advertiser that bids on “blinds” will have its ad run with results from a search for that 
exact term only. See Kate Kaye, Trademark Infringement Disputes Among Search Providers 
Heat Up, MEDIAPOST’S MEDIA DAILY NEWS, at http://www.mediapost.com/ 
PrintFriend.cfm?articleId=241025 (Mar. 8, 2004). 
26. Google, Adwords, supra note 22. 
27. See Susan Kuchinskas, Amid Googlemania, Another Trademark Suit, at http://www. 
clickz.com/news/article.php/3345821 (Apr. 26, 2004).  Prior to April 2004, Google did not sell 
trademarks as keywords.  See id. 
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awarded damages against Google’s French subsidiary.28  Recently, another 
French court ordered Google to stop displaying advertisements for rival 
manufacturers when consumers typed the LOUIS VUITTON trademark into the 
search engine.29 In Germany, a court found that Google’s keyword advertising 
practices constituted trademark use and issued a preliminary injunction against 
the search engine.30 
Mark owners are also suing Google for trademark infringement in the United 
States. In a case in the Eastern District of Virginia, Government Employees 
Insurance Co. v. Google, Inc.,31 an insurance company contended that Google 
infringed its trademark by selling advertising linked to the mark GEICO 
through its Adwords program.  Google moved to dismiss the case on the 
grounds that there was no actionable “use” of the GEICO mark under the 
Lanham Act because the complaint did not allege that Google used the mark “in 
a way that identifies the user as the source of a product.”32  The court denied 
Google’s motion to dismiss, holding instead that selling the GEICO mark 
through the Adwords program constituted a “use” under the Lanham Act.33 
Months later, however, the court granted Google’s motion for judgment as a 
matter of law, concluding that there was insufficient evidence that Google’s use 
of the GEICO mark was likely to confuse consumers.34 
In a separate case in the Northern District of California, American Blind, a 
retailer of custom order window treatments and wall coverings, was offended 
by Google’s Adwords program because it sold its trademarks AMERICAN 
BLIND and AMERICAN BLINDS as keywords.  American Blind contended 
28. See Viaticum/Luteciel v. Google France, T.G.I. Nanterre, 2e ch., Oct. 13, 2003, RG No. 
03/00051; Associated Press, Handbag Maker Vuitton Sues Google (Oct. 24, 2003), available 
at http://www.cnn. com/2003/TECH/biztech/10/24/france.google.ap. 
29. See Frost, supra note 23; Morning Edition: Analysis-Google Battles in Court over 
Sponsored Links (National Public Radio broadcast, Feb. 8, 2005) (transcript on file with author) 
[hereinafter Morning Edition]. 
30. See Metaspinner Media GmbH v. Google Deutschland, LG Hamburg, No. 312 O 
887/02 (Nov. 14, 2003).  A year after granting the preliminary injunction, the German court 
dismissed the case, finding that Google's Adwords program did not violate German trademark 
law. See John Oates, Google German Wins Adwords Trademark Fight, REGISTER, Sept. 22, 
2004, at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/09/22/google_adwords_legal/. 
31. 330 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
32. Id. at 702. 
33. Id. at 704. 
34. Transcript of Bench Trial at 285-87, Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc. (E.D. 
Va. Dec. 15, 2004) (No. 1:04cv507) (on file with author).  The court allowed the case to 
proceed on the issue of whether Google is liable for advertisements that appear as a result of the 
Adwords program that contain the GEICO mark in either the title or their text.  Id. at 287. 
Although Google currently sells trademarks under its Adwords program, it does not allow the 




















      
  
 
185 2005] ANALYSIS OF SEARCH ENGINE ADVERTISING 
that by selling its trademarks to other companies so that other companies’ 
websites would appear under the “Sponsored Links” column when consumers 
typed in the AMERICAN BLIND trademark, Google violated the Lanham 
Act.35  Google filed a motion to dismiss American Blind’s complaint that the 
district court denied.36 
1. Likelihood of Confusion 
To determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion, courts ask whether 
“an appreciable number of reasonably prudent purchasers” likely would be 
confused as to the source or sponsorship of the goods or services in question.37 
To assess whether this appreciable number exists, the courts use a multi-factor 
test.38  These factors are: (1) the strength or distinctiveness of the plaintiff’s 
mark; (2) the degree of similarity between plaintiff’s and defendant’s marks; (3) 
the proximity of the products; (4) the likelihood that plaintiff will bridge the 
gap; (5) actual confusion; (6) defendant’s good faith in adopting the mark; (7) 
the quality of defendant’s product; and (8) the sophistication of the buyers.39 
Chief among these factors is the strength or distinctiveness of the mark at issue. 
Only if the court deems the mark capable of distinguishing the claimant’s goods 
and services from the goods and services of others does the court proceed to an 
evaluation of the other likelihood of confusion factors.40 
Typically, a claimant contends that there is confusion that occurs at the time 
a consumer purchases an allegedly infringing good.41  But consumer confusion 
35. See generally Brief of American Blind, supra note 10. 
36. Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 2005 WL 8232398 (N.D. Cal., 
March 30, 2005).  Another suit is pending against Google (and other search engines) in the 
Eastern District of New York. See Novak v. Overture Servs., 309 F. Supp. 2d 446 (E.D.N.Y. 
2004). 
37. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 103 
F.3d 196, 201 (1st Cir. 1996); see also 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 23:2 (collecting cases). 
38. Although each of the federal circuits has its own list of factors to determine the 
presence or absence of a likelihood of confusion, the factors used by the different circuits are 
quite similar.  3 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 23:19, at 23-69 to -70. 
39. See AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979); Polaroid 
Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). 
40. See Trade Media Holdings Ltd. v. Huang & Assocs., 123 F. Supp. 2d 233, 237-38 
(D.N.J. 2000).  The special circumstances of the Internet make some of the traditional 
likelihood of confusion factors irrelevant.  For example, in the typical trademark infringement 
case, the consumer sees identical or similar marks on two products.  See Intermatic, Inc. v. 
Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1233-34 (N.D. Ill. 1996).  Cases involving the Internet typically 
involve only one mark, rendering the degree of similarity factor irrelevant. See Jonathan A. 
Weininger, Note and Comment, Trademark Metatagging: Lanham Act Liability or Pareto 
Optimality?, 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 469, 484 (2001). 
41. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 23:5, at 23-19. 
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can also be actionable when it occurs after the completed sale42 or even if it 
occurs in the absence of an actual sale.43  A special type of confusion called 
“initial interest confusion” is of particular relevance to trademark use on the 
Internet.44  Initial interest confusion occurs when a consumer seeking a 
particular trademarked service or product is initially lured to a competitor’s 
product by a confusingly similar trademark, even if the consumer later receives 
information that ends the confusion before there has been a sale.45  For example, 
a video rental company that included the trademarked term MOVIEBUFF 
within the internal code for its website was charged with trademark 
infringement by the mark holder.46  The internal code caused a link for the 
video rental company’s website to appear in the search engine results whenever 
MOVIEBUFF was used as a search term.47  The court reasoned that Internet 
users would be diverted to the link for the video rental company’s website when 
they originally intended to go to the MOVIEBUFF website.48  Even if they 
eventually realized that they were not at the mark owner’s website, the court 
concluded this initial confusion could harm the MOVIEBUFF mark owner.49 
2. Current Judicial Definitions of “Use” 
Before assessing likelihood of confusion, a court must determine if there has 
been a “use” of the plaintiff’s mark.50  The Lanham Act’s anti-infringement 
provisions state that it prohibits “use[s] in commerce” of a trademark that are 
likely to cause confusion.51 But exactly what “use in commerce” means is 
unclear.52  The Lanham Act’s legislative history only reveals that “use” should 
42. See, e.g., United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1352-53 (11th Cir. 1987); see 
also 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 23:7 (discussing post-sale confusion doctrine). 
43. See Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 204 (5th Cir. 1998); see also 
3 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 23:6 (discussing initial interest confusion doctrine). 
44. At this time, only the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have accepted an 
initial interest confusion standard. See Melinda M. Kline, Comment, Missing the Mark: The 
Trademark Battle over Software-Based Contextually Targeted Advertising on the Internet, 54 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 917, 929 n.94 (2004). 
45. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 25:69, at 25-158. 
46. Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
47. Id. at 1062. 
48. Id. at 1057. 
49. Id. 
50. See DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bloom, 315 F.3d 932, 936 (8th Cir. 2003); Holiday Inns, 
Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 626 (6th Cir. 1996); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. 
Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 956 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Miss Dig Sys., Inc. v. Power 
Plus Eng’g, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 600, 602 (E.D. Mich. 1996). 
51. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1) (2000). 













   
 
    
       











187 2005] ANALYSIS OF SEARCH ENGINE ADVERTISING 
be defined “flexibly.”53  Some rules for determining “use” have been 
established by various lower courts.  “Use” is not limited to commercial sales,54 
but instead can apply to noncommercial services, including public service 
projects55 and political activities.56  Mere advertising alone is not enough to 
constitute a “use.”57 But these rules only explain what “use” is not, not what 
“use” is.  Although case law provides some basic starting points for defining 
“use,” no concrete definition of trademark “use” exists.58 This  situation leads 
there must be a “use”; and (2) the use must take place “in commerce.”  See Int’l Bancorp, LLC 
v. Societe Des Bains De Mer Et Du Cercle Des Etrangers A Monaco, 329 F.3d 359, 372 (4th 
Cir. 2003).  To satisfy the second element, the action that the plaintiff contends is infringement 
must be “in commerce,” that is, the action must be some aspect of trade that Congress may 
regulate under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.  For example, it has 
been held that distribution of software over the Internet satisfies the “in commerce” 
jurisdictional predicate.  Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1194-95 
(11th Cir. 2001).  The “in commerce” requirement merely reflects the limit of Congress’s 
authority under the Commerce Clause and does not represent an intent to limit the Lanham 
Act’s application to profit-making activities. See United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We 
Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1997).  Some courts incorrectly treat the 
jurisdictional “in commerce” requirement as equivalent to the requirement of a “use” when 
really “use” is a distinct requirement having little to do with the scope of Congress’s authority 
under the Commerce Clause.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 1997 
WL 133313, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. DC Comics, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 
330, 336-37 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).  “[T]here is little question that the ‘in commerce’ requirement 
would be met in a typical Internet message.”  Intermatic v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239 
(N.D. Ill. 1996) (internal citations omitted).
53. Prior to 1988, the Act defined “use in commerce” as “the bona fide use of a mark.” 
Trademark Review Comm’n, U.S. Trademark Ass’n, Report and Recommendations to USTA 
President and Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 395 (1987).  In 1988, the 
definition was revised so that “[t]he term ‘use in commerce’ means the bona fide use of a mark 
in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.”  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1127 (2000).  According to the legislative history, Congress revised its prior definition so that 
“use” would be interpreted “with flexibility so as to encompass various genuine, but less 
traditional trademark uses.”  SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, TRADEMARK LAW REVISION 
ACT OF 1988, S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 44 (1988), reprinted in U.S. TRADEMARK ASS’N, THE 
TRADEMARK REVISION ACT OF 1988 (PUBLIC LAW 100-667): THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
REPORTS, TESTIMONY, AND ANNOTATED STATUTORY TEXT 196 (1989). 
54. Karl Storz Endoscopy-Am., Inc. v. Surgical Techs., Inc., 285 F.3d 848, 855 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
55. See, e.g., United States Jaycees v. Philadelphia Jaycees, 490 F. Supp. 688, 691 (E.D. 
Pa. 1979). 
56. See, e.g., United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 
90-91 (2d Cir. 1997). 
57. Buti v. Impressa Perosa S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 1998). 
58. The court in the American Blind case denied Google’s motion to dismiss “in light of 
the uncertain state of the law” regarding “use.”  Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, 
Inc., No. C 03-05340 JF, 2005 WL 832398, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005). 
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to inconsistent and nonspecific adjudications.59  Instead of grappling with the 
definition of “use,” courts have often plunged ahead with the likelihood of 
confusion analysis, omitting any real discussion of whether the “use” 
requirement has been met.60 
In the past, courts could afford to ignore the “use” requirement because of 
the way trademarks traditionally had been used.  In most cases, the mark at 
issue was printed in an advertisement or affixed to the defendant’s goods. 
Because the trademark utilization at issue was visible to consumers, there was 
little need for a comprehensive analysis of “use.”61  The innovations of the 
Internet, however, have put new pressure on judges to define “use.”62 
Infringement on the Internet differs from traditional trademark disputes in that 
trademarks can be employed by non-mark holders without the consumer ever 
witnessing the mark’s use.  A mark can lure in customers simply by being 
embedded in a website’s internal code63 or being used by a search engine to 
trigger keyword search advertisements. 
In struggling to define “use” under these new technological circumstances, 
courts have come up with two tentative answers.  One approach is to limit the 
definition of “use” to those occasions when a defendant takes a trademark and 
uses it to brand the defendant’s own goods or services.  Another strategy is to 
exclude from the definition of “use” those activities involving trademark that 
59. Compare U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 728 (E.D. Va. 
2003) (ruling that pop-up advertising triggered by trademarked keywords was not a “use”) with 
1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 489-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (ruling that 
such advertising was a “use”); see also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 785 (contending that 
“predicting whether a court would condone or condemn a particular use of a trademark on the 
Internet [is] tricky at best”). 
60. See, e.g., Davidoff & CIE, S.A. v. PLD Int’l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297, 1301 (11th Cir. 
2001); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 346-54 (9th Cir. 1979). 
61. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 958 (C.D. 
Cal. 1996) (explaining that “[i]n the ordinary trademark infringement case . . . there is no 
question that the defendant used the mark [and] the analysis proceeds directly to the issue of 
whether there is a likelihood of confusion”). 
62. Separate, yet related, to the issue of what kind of “use” is necessary for trademark 
infringement is the “use” required of a plaintiff to demonstrate that it holds a valid trademark 
because it “used” its mark in commerce before the defendant did. See Emergency One, Inc. v. 
Am. FireEagle, Ltd., 228 F.3d 531, 536 (4th Cir. 2000).  Although this requirement is similar 
to the “use” necessary to demonstrate infringement, it is not identical.  See 1 MCCARTHY, supra 
note 11, § 3:3, at 3-11; see also 1-800 Contacts, Inc, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 489-90 (holding that 
cases involving the question of whether a plaintiff adequately used its mark to establish a valid 
services mark did not necessarily apply to the question of whether a defendant is “using” a 
plaintiff’s trademark). 
63. See, e.g., Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 
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are “technical” or “mechanical.”  Ultimately, however, neither approach is 
satisfactory.64 
a) Limiting “Use” to a Source Identifier 
A handful of recent cases suggest that a “use in commerce” can only occur 
when the defendant employs the plaintiff’s mark as an identifier of its own 
goods or services.65 According to these cases, unless the defendant is using the 
mark as a badge of identification, there is no “use.”  The Second Circuit 
suggested this definition of “use”  in United We Stand America, Inc. v. United 
We Stand, America New York, Inc.66  The plaintiff in that case was Ross Perot’s 
presidential campaign committee, which had registered the mark “United We 
Stand America.”67  Divisions between Perot’s New York supporters led a rival 
group to organize and use the mark in connection with its political activities.68 
The original committee sued to prevent the rivals from using the mark.  The 
rivals contended that they had not “used” the mark because they were simply 
communicating political ideas just like defendants in other cases who had been 
allowed to employ trademarked terms to communicate a non-commercial 
message.69  The Second Circuit rejected this argument and found infringement, 
explaining that the “crucial difference” between the rival Perot supporters and 
the defendants in the other cases was that the rivals were “using the Mark not 
as a commentary on its owner, but instead as a source identifier.”70  The court 
explained that the rivals had engaged in a “use in commerce” because their “use 
of the Mark seeks to identify [defendant] as part of the same political 
organization or party as [plaintiff] — the party that championed the Perot 
candidacy.”71 
According to the source identifier definition of “use,” for something to be 
used in commerce the use must do more than trade on the goodwill in a mark. 
Instead, the defendant must take the mark and affirmatively identify its own 
64. See infra Part IV.A. 
65. See Interactive Prods. Corp. v. A2Z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 695 
(6th Cir. 2003); DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bloom, 315 F.3d 932, 939 (8th Cir. 2003); United We 
Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 1997); U-Haul 
Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 728 (E.D. Va. 2003); Wells Fargo & Co. 
v. When U.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 763 (E.D. Mich. 2003); Felix the Cat Prods., Inc. 
v. New Line Cinema Corp., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1856, 1858 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 
66. 128 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 1997). 
67. Id. at 88. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 91-92. 
70. Id. at 92. 
71. Id. 
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product with that mark.72  This definition worked well before the arrival of 
Internet commerce when the standard trademark infringement case involved a 
defendant’s efforts to disseminate a misleading advertisement or affix a 
misleading label to its goods.  But the source identifier definition leaves out 
those actions, particularly prevalent on the Internet, whereby a competitor will 
use the consumer’s favorable impression of the plaintiff’s mark to draw in the 
consumer even though the mark is never displayed on a product or an 
advertisement. 
Recent litigation involving pop-up advertising reveals the narrow scope of 
the source identifier definition of “use.”  In three separate cases before three 
different courts, trademark owners contended that the delivery of pop-up 
advertisements to home computers based on the user’s search engine activity 
should constitute “use.”73  All three cases involved WhenU, a company that 
provides online advertising through a software product that generates a pop-up 
ad in a separate browser window when it detects that a user has typed a 
particular trademarked search word into a search engine.74 
The courts in the WhenU cases disagreed as to whether “use” of a mark 
should be limited to use that identifies a source of goods or services. Stating 
that the “trademark laws are concerned with source identification,” two of the 
three courts applied the source identifier definition, holding that using the 
software to trigger advertisements based on trademarked terms was not 
infringement because there was no “trademark use.”75  These courts emphasized 
that consumers never observe how WhenU employs trademarks; instead, the 
trademark is contained on an unseen internal directory.76  Under this 
construction of “use,” trademark infringement cannot exist if the defendant does 
not use the mark to identify the origin of a product or service.  “This does not 
constitute the ‘use’ of any trademark,” one of the courts explained, “because 
72. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 798 (limiting “use” to “confusing uses of the 
mark as a brand”); see also DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bloom, 315 F.3d 932, 939 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(stating that “the mark holder is generally not entitled to relief unless the defendant . . . caus[es] 
the public to see the protected mark and associate the infringer’s goods or services with those 
of the mark holder”) (emphasis added). 
73. See U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 724-25 (E.D. Va. 
2003); Wells Fargo & Co. v. When U.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 736 (E.D. Mich. 2003); 
1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
74. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 476. 
75. Wells Fargo & Co., 293 F. Supp. 2d at 761; see also U-Haul Int’l, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 
2d at 728 (granting summary judgment for WhenU.com because the plaintiff “fails to adduce 
any evidence that WhenU uses [plaintiff’s] trademarks to identify the source of its goods or 
services”). 
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WhenU does not use any of the plaintiffs’s trademarks to indicate anything 
about the source of the products and services it advertises.”77 
In contrast, a third court refused to adopt the source identifier approach.  It 
rejected WhenU’s contention that the Lanham Act requires “use as a trademark 
to identify or distinguish products or services,” and found that there had been 
“use.”78  Instead, the court suggested that an actionable “use” existed because 
WhenU’s software allowed it “to profit from the goodwill and reputation in 
Plaintiff’s website that led the user to access the Plaintiff’s website in the first 
place.”79 
b) A “Use” Must Be More than Technical 
Another trend in the case law is to find nonactionable those uses that are 
“technical.”  For example, in one case, the presence of a trademark in a “post-
domain path” was deemed to fall outside the definition of “use.”80  A post-
domain path is information in a website’s webpage address that comes after a 
domain name.81  The presence of a mark in a domain name82 may be actionable 
because a website’s domain name serves as a signal to Internet users who are 
seeking to locate Internet resources.83 But a mark that is located in a post-
domain path, rather than serving as a signal to consumers, “merely shows how 
the website’s data is organized within the host computer’s files.”84  The court 
granted summary judgment for the defendant without even considering whether 
there was likelihood of confusion.  It held as a matter of law that a post-domain 
77. Wells Fargo & Co., 293 F. Supp. 2d at 762. 
78. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 489. 
79. Id. at 490.  Shortly before this article went to press, the Second Circuit reversed the 
district court in 1-800 Contacts, holding that WhenU's conduct did not constitute "use" under 
the Lanham Act.  Like the Wells Fargo and U-Haul courts, the Second Circuit concluded that 
there was no "use" because WhenU did not reproduce or display the mark itself. 1-800 Contacts, 
Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 408 (2d Cir. 2005). 
80. Interactive Prods. Corp. v. A2Z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 696-97 
(6th Cir. 2003). 
81. For example, in the web page address “a2zsolutions.com/desks/floor/laptraveler/dkfl-
lt.htm”, the domain name is “a2zsolutions.com” and the post-domain path is 
“/desks/floor/laptraveler/dkfl-lt.htm.”  Id. at 691. 
82. A domain name is a string of characters that is assigned to correspond to an Internet 
Protocol (IP) address. Domain names are designed for ease of recall and use because IP 
addresses consist of a hard-to-remember string of integer numbers separated by periods. See 
Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 1999). 
83. See PACCAR Inc. v. Telescan Techs. LLC, 319 F.3d 243, 250 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting 
cases where use of another’s trademark in domain name was held to be actionable). 
84. Interactive Products Corp., 326 F.3d at 696-97. 
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path does not provide a signaling function but merely describes a website’s 
organization, and consequently there was no “use.”85 
Another technical use of a trademark courts may deem nonactionable is the 
act of domain name registration.  In a series of cases involving domain name 
registrar Network Solutions, courts have held that a company that performs the 
service of registering domain names containing trademarked terms is not 
“using” a trademark.86  Registering a domain name entails putting the domain 
name in a directory that links the domain name with the Internet Protocol 
numbers of domain name servers.87  It is these servers that connect domain 
names with Internet resources such as websites and email systems.88  Network 
Solutions charged fees for registering domain names, and at times it registered 
domain names even though those names contained terms owned by entities 
different than the registrant, thereby potentially sowing the seeds for consumer 
confusion.89 
Mark holders sued Network Solutions, contending that the company was 
trading off of the goodwill in their marks by registering domain names 
containing their marks to other companies for a tidy profit.  Nevertheless, the 
courts held that no “use” occurred.  As one court explained, because Network 
Solutions’s only “use” was a “pure machine-linking function,” there could be 
no action under the Lanham Act.90  The court reasoned that Network Solutions 
only placed the mark in a directory so that it could be recognized by the servers 
that make Internet traffic possible.  This “purely nominative” act is not a 
“trademark use” under the Lanham Act.91 Thus, according to these cases, 
merely linking a mark in a way that could cause confusion does not, by itself, 
constitute a “use.”92 
85. Id. at 698 (explaining that “because there is not any evidence that the post-domain path 
of a2z’s portable-computer-stand web page signifies source, it was unnecessary for the district 
court to examine the eight factors traditionally used to determine likelihood of confusion”). 
86. Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 1276, 
1280 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 
956-59 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1303 (C.D. Cal. 
1996); see also Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 878 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a defendant that 
operated an Internet auction site for registered domain names did not “use” the trademarks 
contained in the domain names); HQM, Ltd. v. Hatfield, 71 F. Supp. 2d 500, 504 (D. Md. 1999) 
(registration of domain name and activation for email purposes was not “use”). 
87. IP numbers serve as a unique numerical address for each individual computer or 
network on the Internet. Lockheed Martin Corp., 985 F. Supp. at 952. 
88. Id. at 953. 
89. See id.
90. Id. at 958. 
91. Id. at 957. 
92. In contrast, a plan to buy up domain names containing trademarked terms and later sell 
them to the trademark owners was deemed to be a “use.”  Panavision Int’l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 
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In the WhenU pop-up advertising cases, one of the courts relied on an 
analogy with domain name registration to justify its decision that pop-up 
advertising did not constitute “use.”93  According to the court in U-Haul 
International, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., just as the domain name registrar 
merely links a domain name to an IP server, the pop-up advertiser merely 
places the trademarked term into an invisible internal directory that generates 
links to certain advertisements.94 Holding that there was no “use” and no claim 
for trademark infringement, the court stated that neither action should be 
considered “use” because in each case the trademark was employed for its “pure 
machine-linking function.”95 
3. Fair Use Defenses 
A third important element in trademark infringement law is “fair use.” Even 
if a court finds that there has been a “use” and that this “use” is likely to 
confuse customers, a defendant may still escape liability.96  The Lanham Act’s 
“fair use” defenses — classic fair use and nominative fair use — permit purely 
descriptive references to trademarks.  Fair use reflects a balance at the heart of 
trademark law.  The law is meant to prevent confusing use of marks but not at 
the cost of “depriv[ing] commercial speakers of the ordinary utility of 
descriptive words.”97 
The classic fair use defense to trademark infringement permits a trademark 
to be used to refer to something other than the trademark owner’s product if the 
use “does not imply sponsorship or endorsement of the product because the 
F.3d 1316, 1325-26 (9th Cir. 1998).  The Ninth Circuit found that the domain name purchaser 
“curtailed [the trademark holder’s] exploitation of the value of its trademarks on the Internet, 
a value which [plaintiff] then used when he attempted to sell the Panavision.com domain name 
to Panavision.” Id. at 1325.  In the Ninth Circuit’s view, this case was different than the 
Network Solutions registration cases in that the defendant was attempting to sell the trademark 
itself back to the company, thus capitalizing on the goodwill in the mark rather than simply 
registering a domain name containing a mark at the same price that would be charged to register 
any domain name.  See id. at 1325-26. 
93. See U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 728 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
94. See id. 
95. Id. (citation omitted). 
96. The Supreme Court recently held that a party raising a fair use defense does not have 
to prove that the practice at issue is confusion free. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting 
Impression I, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 542, 547-51 (2004).  Previously, the courts were split as to 
whether there could be fair use as well as a likelihood of confusion. Compare Playboy Enters., 
Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2004) (fair use 
incompatible with likelihood of confusion) with Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, 
Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 270 (2d Cir. 1995) (fair use defense permitted despite evidence of confusion). 
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mark is used only to describe the thing, rather than to identify its source.”98  For 
example, it was held that a cranberry juice manufacturer could use the phrase 
“sweet-tart” in its advertising without infringing on the SWEETART mark for 
candy because this use was strictly descriptive.99  A defendant must establish 
three elements to succeed in a classic fair use defense: (1) the defendant’s use 
of the term “is not as a trademark or a service mark”; (2) defendant uses the 
term “fairly and in good faith”; and (3) defendant uses the term only to describe 
its goods and services.100 
The nominative fair use defense protects purely descriptive references to the 
trademark owner’s goods or services.101  For example, a newspaper that used 
a musical group’s trademark to take a poll of its readers regarding the group’s 
popularity was successful in asserting the fair use defense against the group’s 
claim of trademark infringement.102 Three conditions must be met to 
demonstrate nominative fair use: “(1) the product or service was not readily 
identifiable without use of the trademark; (2) only so much of the mark was 
used as was reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; and (3) the 
use did not suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.”103 
Fair use analysis is separate from a determination of whether there has been 
a “use” of a trademark.  Fair use requires a fact-specific analysis of criteria like 
“good faith,” making its resolution inappropriate prior to a motion for summary 
judgment;104 in contrast, “use” can be evaluated at the motion to dismiss 
stage.105  The “use” requirement acts as a gatekeeper that determines which 
trademark actions should proceed to a second level of analysis where the more 
factually intensive determinations of likelihood of confusion and fair use can 
be evaluated.106  Thus, while the fair use defenses offer important protections 
to non-mark holders, it is still important for courts to grapple with the definition 
of “use.” 
98. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1992). 
99. Sunmark Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 1058 (7th Cir. 1995). 
100. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, §§ 11.45, 11.49, cited in Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Terri 
Welles, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1073-74 (S.D. Cal. 1999). 
101. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 306. 
102. See id. at 309.
103. Kline, supra note 44, at 929-30; see also New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308. 
104. See Sunmark Inc., 64 F.3d at 1058; Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. 
Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
105. See, e.g., Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 330 F. Supp. 2d at 704. 
106. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 805. 
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III. Justifications for Trademark Protection 
Any definition of “use” should arise from the ideological justifications 
behind trademark law.  If the theoretical underpinnings of the Lanham Act call 
for limited application of trademark protection, then “use” should be defined 
narrowly because a narrow definition would exclude many utilizations of marks 
from the test for infringement.  On the other hand, if the basis behind trademark 
law necessitates expansive protection for marks, then “use” should be defined 
broadly so as to sweep as many uses of trademark as possible into the second 
stage likelihood of confusion analysis.  As described below, an examination of 
the reasons behind trademark law demonstrates that “use” should be defined in 
a way so that investments in trademark are encouraged. 
A. Reducing Search Costs 
The dominant rationale for protecting trademarks is their role in reducing 
consumer search costs.107  Laws protecting trademark ownership are considered 
desirable in that they facilitate efficient consumer transactions.108  Without some 
way to rely on brand names, consumers would face a bewildering array of 
competing products and few tools to investigate their qualities.109 Trademarks 
reduce consumer search costs by providing a legally regulated shorthand to 
identify particular products and product providers in the marketplace.110  This 
shorthand provides the consumer with an alternative to carefully researching 
every product and acquiring experience through the trial and error of buying 
and discarding substandard goods.  When trademarks are protected, the 
consumer can rely on the goodwill associated with a brand name that has 
achieved popularity in the marketplace instead of investigating each product or 
service intended for purchase.  According to this rationale, trademark law is 
necessary to prevent outsiders from using marks, or confusing imitations of 
107. See Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 
623-24 (2004) (explaining that this view of trademark law “is now nearly total”). 
108. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 
30 J. L. & ECON. 265, 265-66 (1987) (“[T]rademark law, like tort law in general . . . can best 
be explained on the hypothesis that the law is trying to promote economic efficiency.”). 
109. See Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 197-98 (1985) (stating 
that trademark law is designed to allow consumers “to distinguish among competing 
producers”); Sunrise Jewelry Mfg. Corp. v. Fred S.A., 175 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(same). 
110. See Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The fundamental purpose 
of a trademark is to reduce consumer search costs by providing a concise and unequivocal 
identifier of the particular source of particular goods.”); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo 
Co., 578 F. Supp. 911, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (“[T]he fundamental purpose of a trademark [is] 
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marks, in a way that can confuse consumers and discourage them from relying 
on this shorthand.111 
But even if consumers benefit from relying on trademarks, there is no 
consensus on how zealously mark owners should be protected in order to best 
promote economic efficiency.  Some argue for stringent protections to 
safeguard the rights of mark owners.112  Unlimited trademark protection, 
however, is not desirable.  If consumers can profit from having information on 
which to make informed purchasing decisions, then it is not advisable to 
structure trademark protection in a way that prevents such information from 
being disseminated.  When a trademark owner already dominates the market, 
the only way for a new competitor to describe its product may be to articulate 
differences and similarities with the established product.  Other intellectual 
property scholars contend that trademark protection should be somewhat 
porous; otherwise, so many resources will be expended on advertising that other 
necessary innovations like research and development will suffer.113 
Unfortunately, our understanding of the intersection of intellectual property 
protections and economic theory is incomplete.114  As a result, until more 
empirical evidence is available, a rationale based on economic search costs 
cannot fully determine where to set the boundaries of trademark law.115 
111. See Landes & Posner, supra note 108, at 270. 
112. See, e.g., James A. Rossi, Protection for Trademark Owners: The Ultimate System of 
Regulating Search Engine Results, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 295, 322 (2002) (“Besides 
protecting consumers, trademark law is intended to prevent one from reaping the benefits of 
another’s goodwill.”). 
113. Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade 
Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1169 (1948) (arguing that strong trademark protection results in 
an excessive allocation of resources for advertising, which “is designed not to inform, but to 
persuade and influence”); see also Shannon N. King, Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West 
Coast Entertainment Corp., 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 313, 326-29 (2000) (advocating an 
approach where the free market, rather than legal regulation, is used to curb unauthorized use 
of trademarks in webpage metatags). 
114. See George L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About Intellectual Property: 
Comment on Cheung, in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS 
AND COPYRIGHTS 21, 21-23 (John Palmer ed., 1986); Vincent Chiappetta, Trademarks: More 
Than Meets the Eye, 2003 U. ILL. J. L. TECH & POL’Y 35, 59 (2003) (explaining that “the same 
pesky empirical assessment that continually bedevils economics-based intellectual property 
inquiries” exists because “definitive data are lacking”). 
115. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 2:12, at 2-26 to 2-27 (stating that there is no 
consensus among economists as to whether trademarks and advertising create barriers to market 
entry for non-mark owners); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality 
and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1573 (1993) 
(“It is far from clear that all intellectual property rights add to society’s total wealth . . . .”). 
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B. Making Quality Products 
Another justification for trademark rights is to encourage investment in 
quality.  Mark holders lose their incentive to provide superior products if they 
fear that the brand loyalty created by delivering quality goods and services to 
consumers is likely to be appropriated and ultimately dissipated by their 
rivals.116  If others can appropriate the goodwill created by a quality product by 
simply using someone else’s trademark, producers have little incentive to invest 
in product quality.117  But, if the producer is given ownership of its mark and 
knows that it can prevent confusing uses that could dilute the goodwill that it 
has built up in its mark, then it has a continuing incentive to provide quality 
merchandise.118 
As with the economic search costs rationale, this justification for trademark 
protection only goes so far.  It is impossible to know where to calibrate 
trademark ownership rights so as to maximize brand quality.  Regardless of the 
existence of trademark rights, certain incentives exist to deliver quality products 
and develop loyal customers.  Even in a world without trademarks, if a producer 
wants to obtain repeat business, consumers will have to be satisfied on some 
level with the quality of the product.  As one scholar recently wrote, “trademark 
law is avowedly not designed to resolve any perceived failure in the market for 
quality products and services.”119 Too much trademark protection can create 
disincentives for product quality.  A trademark owner with plenary protection 
for its mark would be able to keep valuable information, such as comparative 
advertising, from reaching consumers.120  Without information regarding 
alternative choices in the marketplace, the owner may be able to trade off of its 
116. See David W. Barnes & Teresa A. Laky, Classic Fair Use of Trademarks: Confusion 
About Defenses, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 833, 838 (2004); William P. 
Kratzke, Normative Economic Analysis of Trademark Law, 21 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 199, 
214-17 (1991); Landes & Posner, supra note 108, at 270. 
117. Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2107 
(2004); Landes & Posner, supra note 108, at 280. 
118. See S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 4 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1274, 
1275 (“Trade-marks encourage the maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the 
benefit of the good reputation which excellence creates.”); Landes & Posner, supra note 108, 
at 269-70. 
119. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 791-92. 
120. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 421 (1999) 
(discussing how trademark protection can encourage monopolistic behavior). 
















    








198 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  58:179 
name, relying on its brand and not taking steps to insure product quality.121 
This is not an outcome that trademark law should encourage. 
C. Promoting Competition 
It is also speculated that by safeguarding the goodwill enjoyed by distinctive 
marks, trademark law benefits consumers by encouraging competition.122 
Congress cited promotion of competition as one reason for passing the Lanham 
Act.123 Under this theory, trademarks facilitate market entry.  Competitors 
looking to break into a market can do so by creating their own distinctive 
brands.124  It is considered easier for a company to attract the necessary amount 
of consumer attention to make a business venture successful by launching a new 
brand or by using an already existing brand than by introducing a new product 
or service without the aid of any commercial shorthand.125  Consumers benefit 
from competition as they are informed of product alternatives when market 
newcomers try to establish goodwill in their marks while doing battle with 
existing suppliers.126 
As described above, however, too much trademark protection can discourage 
competition.127 For example, a trademark regime that prevented comparative 
advertising would harm marketplace newcomers seeking to communicate the 
advantages of their product.128  Changes that have made markets more diffuse 
make it more costly for newcomers to develop the type of mark needed for 
successful market entry.129  As with the other justifications for trademark law, 
there is insufficient economic data for a precise determination of where 
trademark protection should be set to maximize competition. 
121. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE:HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 166 (2004) (describing how 
economic theory shows that “large traditional firms can find it rational to ignore new, 
breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business”). 
122. See Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985); Miss 
Universe, Inc. v. Pitts, 714 F. Supp. 209, 219 (W.D. La. 1989) (“[P]rotection of trademarks is 
desirable because trademarks foster competition”). 
123. S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3, 5 (1946). 
124. Kratzke, supra note 116, at 217-19. 
125. See Chiappetta, supra note 114, at 46; see also Kratzke, supra note 116, at 217-19 
(explaining that trademarks reduce the market power of established sellers and facilitate market 
entry by newcomers by lowering search costs for consumers so they have the time to investigate 
product alternatives). 
126. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 3:5, at 3-14; Barnes & Laky, supra note 116, at 838. 
127. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text. 
128. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 788 (“Overly restrictive trademark law has the 
potential to stifle competition rather than to facilitate it.”). 
129. See infra Part II.E.1. 
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D. Protecting a Moral Right Against Unjust Enrichment 
The justifications for trademark described thus far are based on perceptions 
of economic behavior.  A separate rationale is that, regardless of the economic 
efficiencies involved, an investment in mark goodwill should be protected 
simply because allowing a rival to appropriate that goodwill would be 
“unfair.”130  This argument is not based on utilitarian concerns about how to 
structure legal incentives to engineer “the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number.”131  Instead, it is based on the moral concern that it is unjust to allow 
a competitor to take and use a mark without offering some compensation to the 
mark owner.  Such use is considered “unfair because, by using a rival’s mark, 
the infringer capitalizes on the investment of time, money and resources of his 
competitor.”132  This theory of trademark rights is at times referred to as the 
“unjust enrichment” argument.133 
Although not explicitly referencing a moral or natural rights basis for their 
decisions, courts have emphasized the inequity of permitting others to freeride 
on trademark goodwill.134  For example, in 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. 
130. See, e.g., Neel Chatterjee & Connie E. Merriett, U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 
Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc. and 1-800-Contacts Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc.: Pop-Up 
Advertising as “Use In Commerce” Under the Lanham Act: A Case Analysis, 20 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1113, 1135-36 (2004) (speculating that “the underlying sense of 
unfairness” in a pop-up software manufacturer’s utilization of trademarked terms to trigger 
advertisements could cause the courts to hold that there had been “use”). 
131. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 14 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970) (1789). 
132. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305-06 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
133. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 2:31, at 2-56 to 2-57; Bone, supra note 117, at 
2111. 
134. See, e.g., Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t, 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 
(9th Cir. 1999) (upholding trademark infringement claim because “[a]lthough there is no source 
confusion in the sense that consumers know [whom] they are patronizing . . . there is initial 
interest confusion in the sense that . . . [defendant] improperly benefits from the goodwill that 
[the plaintiff] developed in its mark”); Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76, 80 
(2d Cir. 1981) (“To deny [the plaintiff] injunctive relief would be to enable [the defendant] to 
reap where [i]t has not sown.”) (internal citations omitted); 1-800 Contacts, Inc., v. 
WhenU.com, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 489-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (emphasizing the unfairness 
of permitting the pop-up software manufacturer “to profit from the goodwill and reputation in 
Plaintiff’s website”); United States Shoe Corp. v. Brown Group, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 196, 198-99 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating that “[i]t would be unfair to permit competitors to piggyback on the 
reputation earned by” a merchant who “had built up a customer recognition (secondary 
meaning) in a descriptive mark”); see also Bone, supra note 117, at 2113 (“Since the 1930s, 
unjust enrichment rhetoric has appeared from time to time in a number of trademark 
opinions.”); Chatterjee & Merriett, supra note 130, at 1135-36 (detecting an undercurrent of 
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WhenU.com,135 there was little chance of actual confusion because the 
consumers at issue had all chosen to install WhenU’s software on their 
computers to trigger pop-up advertising linked to trademarked keywords.136 As 
a result, there was no danger of increasing consumer search costs by allowing 
the pop-up advertisements to continue.  Nevertheless, the court held that there 
was an actionable “use” because the software allowed the defendant “to profit 
from the goodwill and reputation in Plaintiff’s website.”137  Other decisions 
highlight the need to protect an owner’s investment in mark goodwill138 and to 
prevent “freeriding” on the plaintiffs’ marks;139 this language suggests a 
justification of trademark protection based on a moral right to prevent unfair 
profiteering off of someone else’s trademark. 
There is a certain appeal to the idea that non-mark holders should not be 
allowed to appropriate the time, energy, and effort that a mark holder has 
invested in its mark.  But the mere existence of freeriding should not be enough 
to trigger an exclusive ownership right.  After all, much of the competition in 
the marketplace that is considered beneficial is based in part on freeriding.140 
135. 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
136. Id. at 477-78. 
137. Id. at 490; see also id. at 489 (explaining that “[d]efendants are ‘using’ Plaintiff’s 
marks” because the software relies on the computer user’s “prior knowledge [of the Plaintiff’s 
marks] . . . knowledge that is dependent on Plaintiff’s reputation and goodwill”). 
138. See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 32 (2003) 
(explaining that the Lanham Act prohibits actions like trademark infringement that “impair a 
producer’s goodwill”); Park ’N Fly v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) (stating 
that trademark law needs to “secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business”); 
Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coti, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) (“A trademark only gives the right to 
prohibit the use of it so far as to protect the owner’s good will.”); Nitro Leisure Prods., LLC v. 
Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining that “the owner of the 
trademark must have the energy and effort he expended in building goodwill in his trademark 
protected from misappropriation”); America Online, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 821 
(4th Cir. 2001) (“At bottom, the law of trademarks intends to protect the goodwill represented 
by marks and the valid property interests of entrepreneurs in that goodwill against those who 
would appropriate it for their own use.”). 
139. See, e.g., Comerica Inc. v. Fifth Third Bancorp, 282 F. Supp. 2d 557, 573 (E.D. Mich. 
2003) (discussing freeriding in applying likelihood of confusion test); Tommy Hilfiger 
Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that 
intent to freeride is the necessary intent for finding bad faith in trademark infringement cases). 
140. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001) (“[C]opying 
is not always discouraged or disfavored by the laws which preserve our competitive 
economy.”); Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938) (stating that not 
only is “sharing in the goodwill of [an] article . . .  widely extended by vast expenditures in 
advertising” acceptable, but that such sharing benefits “the consuming public”); Kratzke, supra 
note 116, at 220 (“Most competitive endeavors involve an element of appropriation.”); Maureen 
O’Rourke, Defining the Limits of Free-Riding in Cyberspace: Trademark Liability for 
Metatagging, 33 GONZ. L. REV. 277, 279 (1998) (explaining that many legitimate businesses 
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For example, the law permits reverse engineering of chemical and mechanical 
articles in the public domain even though the reverse engineer surely is 
profiting off of the hard work of the original inventor.141  There is nothing 
particularly special about the goodwill bound up in a trademark that should 
make its appropriation actionable while freeriding in other areas is considered 
perfectly acceptable.142 
Thus, any moral objection to a trademark defendant “endeavoring to reap 
where it has not sown”143 is not sufficient, by itself, to justify protection of a 
mark.  It can only be the particular way in which such freeriding is attempted 
that may offend society’s sensibilities and shape the determination of whether 
or not there is infringement.144  This means that the law need not prevent all 
instances of appropriation of the goodwill in a trademark. It also means that it 
is not up to the mark’s owner to choose to prevent every instance of freeriding 
on its mark. Instead, other theoretical justifications for trademark law must be 
consulted to determine if such freeriding deserves to be stopped.  Moral 
arguments for intellectual property rights are in tension with the utilitarian 
recognition that intellectual property rights must be substantially weaker than 
those granted to other property owners because an ownership right in copyright, 
patent, or trademark is particularly coercive in that it prevents others from re-
creating and using the same property themselves.145  Ultimately, there is a value 
engage in a certain degree of freeriding). 
141. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160 (1989). 
142. In fact, as described below, trademarks have long been viewed as less worthy of 
protection than other types of intellectual property. See infra Part II.E.1. 
143. Int’l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918). 
144. Bone, supra note 117, at 2114; see Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 
130 (1947) (explaining that the windfall a second-hand dealer receives from using a trademark 
is “wholly permissible so long as the manufacturer is not identified with the inferior qualities 
of the product”). 
145. Trademarks, like other types of intellectual property, are imperfect public goods in that 
they take some effort to create but they are easily copied.  ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. 
RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 672-76 (4th ed. 1998).  Thus, unlike other types of property that 
cannot be easily replicated, intellectual property requires special regulation to prevent others 
from copying the property of another.  In this sense, intellectual property rights are much more 
coercive than other property rights in that they prevent not only taking but mere re-creation of 
the property as well. See Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents Morally Justified?, in COPY FIGHTS: THE 
FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (Adam Thierer & Clyde Wayne 
Crews, Jr. eds., 2002) at 54 [hereinafter COPY FIGHTS] (“In contrast [to real property rights], to 
claim a property right over a process is to claim a blanket right to control the actions of 
others.”); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 800-01 (discussing how intellectual property is 
“fundamentally different” from real property and, therefore, deserving of weaker protection); 
see also Landes & Posner, supra note 108, at 267-68 (emphasizing that intellectual property is 
a particularly costly form of property because, unlike real property, the marginal cost of using 
intellectual property is zero and, therefore, the cost of excluding others from using the property 
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to protecting brand investment from appropriation from others, but it is a value 
based not on moral rights but on the utilitarian premise that there is a need to 
encourage investment in trademarks to maximize social value.146 
E. Encouraging Mark Investment 
From the beginnings of trademark law in the United States, courts have been 
hostile to justifications based on the value of intellectual output of brand 
creators.  This view of trademark has become outdated, however, because 
modern mark invention requires an intense commitment of expertise and 
resources.  For this reason, the law should encourage trademark creation. 
Justifying trademark law on the need to encourage mark investment will not 
necessarily lead to a “propertization” of trademark rights. 
1. What It Takes to Make a Modern Mark 
In the Trade-Mark Cases,147 where the U.S. Supreme Court first considered 
the legality of federal trademark regulation as a whole, the Court contended that 
“[t]he ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to invention or 
discovery.”148  The Court explained that unlike musical and literary works that 
spring quickly from the creative energies of their composers, trademarks are 
generally developed after a considerable period of use.  In contrast to works of 
authorship that are “original, and are founded in the creative powers of the 
mind,” the Court explained that trademarks are generally “the adoption of 
something already in existence.”149  Thus, the Court reasoned, there is no need 
for the law to step in immediately to protect a trademark’s creator as it would 
to protect the composer of a new song.  The Court also had little appreciation 
for the intellectual acumen required to build a brand, explaining “[i]t is often the 
result of accident rather than design, and when under the act of Congress it is 
sought to establish it by registration, neither originality, invention, discovery, 
science, nor art is in any way essential to the right conferred by that act.”150  In 
sum, a trademark does not “depend upon novelty, invention, discovery, or any 
work of the brain.”151  This disdain towards the intellectual input needed to 
is a “deadweight loss”). 
146. Because protection of intellectual property involves an extra level of coercion beyond 
real property rights, its application should be limited.  Nevertheless, there may be situations 
when the moral basis for awarding ownership rights to intellectual property outweighs 
countervailing utilitarian concerns. See Mark Bartholomew, Protecting the Performers: Setting 
a New Standard for Character Copyrightability, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 341, 350-60 (2001). 
147. 100 U.S. 82 (1879). 
148. Id. at 94-95. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
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create a viable trademark has continued into the modern era.  A more modern 
court opined that “a man of ordinary intelligence could easily devise a score of 
valid trade-marks in a short period of time.”152 
Thus, since the beginning of trademark regulation in the United States, 
trademark has been viewed as separate from copyright and patent in that no 
incentives are required to encourage its creation.153  Although trademarks were 
considered valuable as efficiency-enhancing signals, they were not deemed 
worthy of encouragement by the law because they were considered so simple 
to create.  Instead, trademark policy was strictly focused on the goal of 
eliminating consumer confusion once it appears it marketplace.  This view of 
trademarks — as in endless supply and relatively cost free to create — 
continues to this day.154 
This view of trademarks is outdated.  Today, brand development requires an 
intense commitment of resources.155  For a trademark to serve as an effective 
signal to consumers, a mark holder must not only attract public attention, but 
also infuse the brand with the information and values inherent in the product.156 
trademark . . . bears very little analogy to that which exists in copyrights or in patents for new 
inventions or discoveries, as they are not required to be new, and may not involve the least 
invention or skill in their discovery or application.”). 
152. Ambrosia Chocolate Co. v. Ambrosia Cake Bakery, Inc., 165 F.2d 693, 697 (4th Cir. 
1947); see also Procter & Gamble Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Inc., 485 F. Supp. 1185, 1210 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (“Distinctive marks are plentiful almost without limit, as long as people 
possess imaginations to create them.”). 
153. See Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 768 (1990) 
(stating that “trademark law may be described as indifferent to the creation of marks”).  This 
hostility to any argument for stronger rights based on the intellectual acumen of trademark 
creators may come from trademark law’s unique Constitutional origins.  Copyright and patent, 
unlike trademark, are specifically contemplated by the Constitution’s Intellectual Property 
Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  Trademark law has had to find its support in the 
Commerce Clause, a distinction that may have driven trademark law in a different direction 
from its intellectual property brethren. See Chiappetta, supra note 114, at 52-53. 
154. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the 
Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 399 (1990) (“[T]here is little need to create 
economic incentives to encourage businesses to develop a vocabulary with which to conduct 
commerce.”); Landes & Posner, supra note 108, at 273 (“Either the costs of thinking up new 
words are slight, or the incentives to do so, independent of any direct compensation, are 
great.”). 
155. There is great financial risk in developing trademarks as the launch of a new brand can 
cost tens of millions of dollars.  JUDITH LYNNE ZAICHKOWSKY, DEFENDING YOUR BRAND 
AGAINST IMITATION 9 (1995); see, e.g., Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John's Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 
491 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Since 1995, Papa John's has invested over $300 million building customer 
goodwill in its trademark ‘Better Ingredients. Better Pizza.’”). 
156. Mats Urde, Core Value Based Corporate Brand Building, 37 EUR. J. MARKETING 1017, 
1020-21 (2003) (describing how the value of a brand and the value of the organization are 
inextricably linked, causing corporate strategies and business plans to revolve around brand 
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If the consumer does not receive this information, but only is made aware of the 
brand’s name, then her awareness of the trademark is meaningless.157  TIDY 
CAT is easier to remember and suggests more of the qualities a prospective 
consumer would be looking for in cat litter than QZFBW.  Discovering a mark 
that captures a product’s attributes while at the same time resonating with 
consumers requires time, effort, and creativity.158 
According to the view first espoused in the Trademark Cases and continuing 
into the present, trademarks require no creative capital whatsoever because 
mark holders, instead of seeking to create a mark, merely wait for something to 
resonate with the public after a lengthy period of use.159  In actuality, this is no 
longer the case.  Today, substantial investment in development and testing are 
required before a mark is ready for introduction into the marketplace.160  Instead 
of waiting to see what products gain popularity among the consuming public, 
businesses look to launch brands early in order to gain a foothold with 
consumers.161 
As the marketplace has expanded and the number of media sources available 
to consumers has mushroomed, more and more investment is required to 
develop a successful mark.162  The national and global scope of the economy 
makes it increasingly difficult for a particular brand to rise above the 
informational clutter.163  At the same time, consumers have become more 
resistant to brand advertising, requiring an even greater investment of 
appeal); see also ZAICHKOWSKY, supra note 155, at 48-49 (describing how consumers scrutinize 
a brand for “things that are somehow essential to the task at hand”). 
157. See generally Kim Robertson, Strategically Desirable Brand Name Characteristics, 1 
J. PROD. & BRAND MGMT. 3 (1992) (discussing what makes a “good” brand name). 
158. Chiappetta, supra note 114, at 58 (“Looking for the ‘best’ choice among the myriad of 
clearly unequal marks requires not only time and money, but also professional expertise in the 
relevant fields.”). 
159. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94-95 (1879). 
160. Carter, supra note 153, at 770; Jerre B. Swann et al., Trademarks and Marketing, 91 
TRADEMARK REP. 787, 791 (2001) [hereinafter Swann, Trademarks] (describing the expertise 
and research that goes into building and protecting modern brands). 
161. See QuickMBA, Positioning, at http://www.quickmba.com/marketing/ries-trout/ 
positioning/ (advising market entrants to introduce their brands early to influence consumers 
and obtain the most market share) (last visited Aug. 8, 2005). See generally Tim Ambler & 
Chris Styles, Brand Development Versus New Product Development: Toward a Process Model 
of Extension Decisions, 6 J. PROD. & BRAND MGMT. 222 (1997) (contending that successful 
brand extension launches are more about brand development than product development). 
162. Denis L. Duffy, Customer Loyalty Strategies, 15 J. CONSUMER MARKETING. 435, 435 
(1998) (discussing how “the proliferation and fragmentation of media options make it more 
difficult to reach and acquire new customers”); see also Swann, Trademarks, supra note 160, 
at 795 (speaking of the need for strong trademarks in “a complex and cluttered market place”). 
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intellectual and economic capital in brand development.164  And even after a 
mark has been chosen, there must be a substantial commitment of resources to 
place that brand before the public so that the mark’s signaling function can 
attract consumers and achieve the reduction in consumer search costs that is at 
the heart of trademark law.165 
2. Encouragement Does Not Require “Propertization” 
The very existence of trademark law means that there is a recognized value 
to the introduction of new trademarks.166  The difficulties of discovering and 
disseminating a new mark require some encouragement of mark creation.167  It 
164. Duffy, supra note 162, at 435 (noting that customer audiences have become resistant 
to commercial messages); Jerre B. Swann, Dilution Redefined for the Year 2002, 92 
TRADEMARK REP. 585, 604-06 (2002) (same). 
165. See Chiappetta, supra note 114, at 58. 
166. One criticism leveled at trademark protection is that by creating incentives for brand 
development, the law only encourages resources to be spent on marketing that is designed to 
appeal to consumers for reasons that are not in their best interests.  See Brown, supra note 113, 
at 1169 (arguing that strong trademark protection results in an excessive allocation of resources 
for advertising, which “is designed not to inform, but to persuade and influence.”); see also 
Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 801 (“We grant patents and copyrights in order to 
encourage the creation of patented and copyrighted works. There is no similar need to 
encourage the creation of brands.”); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death 
of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1695 (1999) (speculating that “we might be better off 
in a world with . . . less of the artificial product differentiation that Brown derided”). 
Consumers, however, are not as easily deceived as once thought. Research shows that a 
consumer will typically purchase a particular brand out of self-interest, not from some sort of 
unswerving loyalty derived from clever advertising. See Landes & Posner, supra note 108, at 
274-75; Swann, Trademarks, supra note 160, at 791; see also Mark D. Uncles, et al., Customer 
Loyalty and Customer Loyalty Programs, 20 J. CONSUMER MARKETING 294, 300, 315-16 
(2003) (explaining that consumers continue to participate in frequent flyer programs out of a 
perceived benefit, not from brand loyalty).  A consumer is not acting irrationally by relying on 
a brand preference in making a purchasing decision.  Instead, the consumer is acting to make 
her purchasing decisions more efficient, relying on a trademark instead of performing a 
comparative analysis between products and thereby saving time for other pursuits. 
ZAICHKOWSKY, supra note 155, at 18. 
A related concern is that trademarks today serve more as advertisements than as a shorthand 
for the sharing of relevant information with consumers.  See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Johnson 
& Johnson, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 1185, 1211 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (contending that modern trademarks 
are used to generate demand in ways not contemplated when the Lanham Act was adopted). 
Again, however, consumers usually respond to the signaling power in a mark because it 
communicates something about the essence of the product that they believe will enhance their 
welfare, not because the mark has no informational value. See Landes & Posner, supra note 
108, at 274-75; Uncles, supra, at 305 (explaining that “most people generally only buy what 
they need”). 
167. Some might argue that even if trademark development should be encouraged, sufficient 
incentives already exist under the current regime.  See Lemley, supra note 166, at 1695 (“After 
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is time to discard the outdated view of trademark law as solely geared to ex post 
protection of consumers.  Trademark owners should know that rivals who have 
confused consumers as to the true sponsorship of their marks will be stopped. 
But the importance of trademarks in today’s society also requires infringement 
law to consider the ex ante need to encourage trademark investment even before 
there is a sign of confusion. 
Some argue that a trademark regime based on the need to encourage 
investment in trademarks will encourage the “propertization” of trademark 
law.168  In other words, they fear a regime where a trademark owner enjoys the 
same protections over her trademark as she would over real property.  Of 
particular concern to those fearing the “propertization” of trademark has been 
the rise of the dilution doctrine, a legal theory that protects certain marks 
against uses that lessen the capacity of a famous mark to identify and 
distinguish goods or services.169  Dilution is objectionable to some 
commentators because it is designed to protect trademark investment, not to 
reduce consumer search costs.170  But even apart from dilution, there has been 
concern that trademark infringement law has already leaped its natural 
moorings and that courts are willing to find infringement where no infringement 
exists.171  The concern is that if courts justify their protection of trademark in 
terms of protecting an owner’s investment, they will be inclined to treat 
trademark as a standard property right and create an overexpansive definition 
of infringement.172 
all, we don’t necessarily want more trademarks as an end in itself.”).  But trademarks, like other 
types of intellectual property, are extremely susceptible to cheap copying at little cost to the 
infringer.  See Chiappetta, supra note 114, at 61.  In addition, the inherent signaling power of 
a trademark means that someone who appropriates that mark may have to do very little to attract 
customers to the misleading signal.  Id. at 62.  To a large degree, these problems may already 
be corrected for by trademark law’s current emphasis on reducing consumer confusion.  But 
even if true, this does not contradict the desirability of investment in trademark or militate 
against allowing the encouragement justification to inform trademark infringement analysis. 
168. See Carter, supra note 153, at 767-69; Lemley, supra note 166, at 1698; see also 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 237 (2001) (discussing danger of referring to 
intellectual property as “property”). 
169. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). 
170. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 166, at 1698-99; Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional 
Expansion of American Trademark Law: A Civil Law System in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 827, 882 (2000). 
171. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 822 (questioning recent case law finding initial 
interest confusion when there is merely “likelihood of diversion,” not likelihood of confusion). 
172. Id. at 783; cf.  SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE ANARCHIST IN THE LIBRARY: HOW THE 
CLASH BETWEEN FREEDOM AND CONTROL IS HACKING THE REAL WORLD AND CRASHING THE 
SYSTEM xiii (2004) (explaining that “[a]n appeal to ‘property’ removes information policy 
discussions from the public interest”). 
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Mark holders should not enjoy the same rights as other owners of property. 
Unlike rights to physical items of property that can be restricted simply by the 
fact that they are possessed by one person, intellectual property can be copied 
by others with little effort.  Intellectual property rights are more coercive than 
other property rights in that they control the actions of others by preventing 
them from making their own re-creations of the items in question.173  As a  
result, intellectual property ownership needs to be limited. 
But recognition that trademark law should provide incentives for mark 
creation does not mean that the mark holder needs to enjoy the same property 
rights as a real property owner.  Patent and copyright protection for inventors 
and authors is justified as necessary to foster artistic creations,174 yet a host of 
restrictions remain on these ownership rights that do not exist for real property. 
Copyright law protects an owner against infringement of her original expression 
but it does not protect against appropriation of her ideas.175  Copyright and 
patent ownership can only last for a finite period.176  The copyright fair use 
defense protects those who would use copyrighted materials for what are seen 
as socially desirable ends or for purposes that pose no threat to the incentives 
for artistic creation.177 
Trademark law is no different.178  Trademark holders face several restrictions 
on their ownership rights that do not apply to other types of property.  The mark 
holder must actively use its mark in order to receive protection from 
173. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
174. See, e.g., VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 172, at 92 (arguing about the need to maintain 
creative incentives for production of copyrightable works); Jessica Littman, Revising Copyright 
Law for the Information Age, in COPY FIGHTS, supra note 145, at 127 (“Conventional wisdom 
tells us that without the incentives provided by copyright, entrepreneurs will refuse to invest in 
new media.”). 
175. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1880). 
176. Patents other than design patents last for seventeen years.  1 DONALD S. CHISUM, 
CHISUM ON PATENTS, at OV-2 (2004). With some exceptions, copyrights last for the life of the 
author plus seventy years.  3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 9.01 (2004). 
177. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (explaining that 
“[f]rom the infancy of copyright protection, [the fair use doctrine] has been thought necessary 
to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts’”) 
(quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8).  See generally John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The 
Triumph of Natural Law Copyright, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 465 (2005) (discussing the 
importance of the fair use doctrine in pushing copyright law away from the goal of promoting 
progress in the arts and towards complete protection of authors’ rights). 
178. Justice Holmes, while sitting on the Massachusetts Supreme Court, was cognizant of 
the need for trademark ownership to face restrictions akin to those of copyright: “When the 
common law developed the doctrine of trade-marks and trade-names, it was not creating a 
property in advertisements more absolute than it would have allowed the author of Paradise 
Lost.”  Chadwick v. Covel, 23 N.E. 1068, 1069 (Mass. 1890). 
 
 
   
   
    
 
   
 
  













208 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  58:179 
infringers.179 Trademark fair use defenses shield non-mark holders from 
liability when trademarks are used in a purely descriptive sense.180 A regulatory 
regime based in part on the need to encourage creation of a particular type of 
property does not necessarily have to confer monopoly ownership of that 
property.181  Instead, the key issue is how to implement the encouragement 
justification for trademark law without doing damage to other considerations 
such as reduction of consumer search costs or protecting the descriptive use of 
marks by non-owners. 
IV. A Better Definition of “Use” 
A. Problems with the Current Definition of “Use” 
For several reasons, a better definition of “use” is needed to provide 
guidance to mark holders, potential mark users, and the courts.  First, “use” has 
not been adequately defined in the case law, resulting in inconsistent 
adjudications.182  For most of the Lanham Act’s history, the “use” portion of the 
test for infringement was relatively unimportant.183  Recently, however, “use” 
has become the central issue in disputes over new variants of Internet 
commerce that trade on consumer goodwill.184  Trademark case law has yet to 
catch up. 
Second, the definition of “use” is in danger of making the fair use defense 
irrelevant.  Some judicial decisions propose that “use” be defined as using a 
mark as a trademark.185  The problem with this definition is that it writes the fair 
179. See United Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (“[T]he right to a 
particular mark grows out of its use, not its mere adoption.”); Allard Enters., Inc. v. Advanced 
Programming Res., Inc., 146 F.3d 350, 356 (6th Cir. 1998) (“One of the bedrock principles of 
trademark law is that trademark or ‘service mark ownership . . . flow[s] only from . . . actual use 
in the market.’”) (quoting Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg., 931 F.2d 1100, 1105 (6th 
Cir. 1991)); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 16:4 (discussing plaintiff’s use requirement). 
180. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 12 (2d Cir. 1976); 
United States Shoe Corp. v. Brown Group, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 196, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
181. See 1 JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION & PRACTICE § 1-35 (explaining that 
there is no legal monopoly in a trademark). 
182. See supra note 59 and accompanying text; see also Benjamin F. Sidbury, Comparative 
Advertising on the Internet: Defining the Boundaries of Trademark Fair Use for Internet 
Metatags and Trigger Ads, 3 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 35, 37 (2001) (commenting on inconsistency 
among courts in defining “use” and infringement with regard to metatagging and keyword 
trigger advertisements). 
183. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. 
184. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
185. See Interactive Prods. Corp. v. A2Z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 695 
(6th Cir. 2003) (“If defendants are only using IPC’s trademark in a ‘non-trademark’ way . . . 
then trademark infringement . . . laws do not apply.”); Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 










    
 
   
  
  
    







   
  
 
209 2005] ANALYSIS OF SEARCH ENGINE ADVERTISING 
use defense out of the law.  Fair use requires that the defendant not use the term 
as a trademark or a service mark.186  If “use” is simply read as using the mark 
as a trademark, then the fair use defense would never apply because under the 
“use” requirement, if a mark is not used as a trademark, then there is no claim 
for infringement.  There would be no point in evaluating an infringer’s actions 
under the fair use defense if the case has to be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim.187  Unless the fair use defense is to be made irrelevant, “use” should not 
be equivalent to “use as a trademark.” 
Third, and most importantly, the definition of “use” should be tailored to the 
justifications behind trademark law.188  If the object of the definition of “use” 
is to facilitate trademark’s goal of encouraging trademark investment, then the 
definition should make actionable those uses of trademark that threaten mark 
goodwill.  The traditional view of trademarks is that they are relatively cost free 
to create, and thus there has not been much effort to provide incentives for 
trademark creation.  Courts could thus afford to ignore the “use” requirement 
and focus solely on the likelihood of confusion test.189  Now that Internet  
commerce has made “use” an issue, some courts and commentators advocate 
for a definition of “use” that is limited to those occasions when the defendant 
employs a mark to brand another product.190  The problem is that even 
nonbranding uses can create substantial disincentives for trademark creation, 
as well as cause confusion in consumers.  Defining “trademark use” to apply 
only in situations where the defendant has used the owner’s trademark to brand 
the defendant’s own goods and services does not further what, in addition to 
reducing consumer search costs, should be the main rationale of trademark law: 
encouraging trademark creation. 
The Google cases serve as an instructive example of how a constricted 
definition of “use” could lead to the wrong outcomes.  In the pending American 
using the trademark as a trademark”); Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 
1303 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (noting that the defendant “traded on the value of the marks as marks”). 
186. Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002). 
187. In contrast to analysis of “use,” evaluation of the fair use defense can require a fact-
specific analysis that makes it inappropriate for resolution on a motion to dismiss. See Gov’t 
Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
188. In speaking of the related concept of use as establishing “first possession” of a 
trademark, Landes and Posner emphasize the need for tying the definition of “use” to the 
theoretical justifications behind trademark.  See Landes & Posner, supra note 108, at 282 
(stating that “conditioning trademark rights on use is a way of limiting the use of scarce 
enforcement resources to situations in which the rights in question are likely to yield net social 
benefits”). 
189. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
190. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. When U.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 761 (E.D. Mich. 
2003); U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 728 (E.D. Va. 2003); 
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Blind case, American Blind submitted evidence that some consumers believed 
that it sponsored the links on Google’s search engine results page that were 
listed under the heading “Sponsored Links.”191 In reality, the “Sponsored 
Links,” which were generated when someone using Google typed in 
AMERICAN BLIND as a search term, were a series of links to American 
Blind’s competitors.192 
Strictly speaking, Google did not use the AMERICAN BLIND mark to 
brand its own product.  Under the source identifier definition of use, Google 
would never face liability for its actions because it did not “use” the plaintiff’s 
mark, that is, it did not brand its own goods or services with the term 
AMERICAN BLIND.193  But Google did sell the mark and, at least according 
to the evidence presented by American Blind, the Adwords program confused 
consumers about the mark’s source, threatening the goodwill American Blind 
built up in its mark.  Because Google is trading off of the goodwill in others’ 
marks, its conduct should be evaluated under the likelihood of confusion test. 
Conduct like Google’s keyword search advertising discourages mark 
investment.  If the Internet can be used to mislead consumers as to a mark’s 
origin, then marks lose their signaling power and businesses lose the incentive 
to create marks.194  The new challenges of the Internet therefore require a 
broader definition than the source identifier definition of use.  Google should 
not be held liable for selling trademarked keywords unless consumers are likely 
to be confused by its use of the mark.  But that determination should be made 
through the multi-factor likelihood of confusion test, not an overly narrow 
definition of “use.” 
B. A Better Definition of “Use” 
A “use” should be defined as relying on a re-creation of a mark in an effort 
to trade on consumer goodwill in that mark. The re-creation of the mark could 
be made by the defendant or by consumers. Instead of asking whether or not 
the defendant has used the mark as a source identifier, the court should question 
whether the defendant’s reliance on the signaling power of the mark could harm 
the mark’s role as a source identifier.  Such a definition would identify search 
engines like Google that sell advertising based on trademarked keywords as 
potential infringers, but Google would only be liable for infringement if its use 
191. Morning Edition, supra note 29; Transcript of Bench Trial, supra note 34, at 281-84. 
192. Brief of American Blind, supra note 10, ¶ 22. 
193. See U-Haul Int’l, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d at 728 (using “source identifier” definition to 
hold that installation of unseen software directory of trademarked search engine keywords that 
triggered pop-up advertisements was not “use”); Wells Fargo & Co., 293 F. Supp. 2d at 761 
(same). 
194. See Landes & Posner, supra note 108, at 270. 
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was also deemed likely to confuse consumers.  As described below, a definition 
of “use” linked to efforts to trade on mark goodwill would encourage mark 
investment by allowing acts that provide a disincentive for brand creation to 
proceed to the likelihood of confusion analysis.  Rather than causing the 
propertization of trademark law, the definition would exclude “technical” uses 
of a trademark, ones that do not impact mark goodwill, from the infringement 
analysis.  The definition would have the additional benefit of permitting those 
mark uses that potentially confuse consumers yet should be allowed nonetheless 
because they are important to the free flow of information.  The definition is 
particularly appropriate given the differences between trademark use on the 
Internet and more traditional trademark use. 
1. Basing “Use” on Trading on a Mark’s Goodwill Would Encourage 
Trademark Investment 
If investment in trademark creation is a goal that the law should encourage, 
then the law must assure mark creators that others cannot take actions that 
reduce the signaling power of their marks.  To encourage trademark investment, 
“use” should apply not only to mark uses that identify the defendant’s own 
goods and services, but more generally to any re-creation of a mark that is used 
to trade on the mark’s goodwill. 
This is different than simply defining “use” as providing information that 
identifies a source of goods or services.  A non-mark holder can threaten a 
mark’s goodwill without ever identifying a particular source for the mark. To 
illustrate, consider how consumers conduct searches on the Internet. 
Consumers often select trademarked terms for their searches based on the 
feelings of goodwill they already hold towards particular marks.195 They do not 
expect their search results to be merely descriptive.196 A search engine or pop-
up software program that triggers advertising based on the input of trademarked 
search terms is trading off of consumer goodwill even if it does not identify a 
particular source for the keyword mark. 
Admittedly, to a large degree the likelihood of confusion test already 
provides incentives for trademark creation.  The confusion created when 
consumers believe that a non-mark holder is the source of a particular mark, and 
that non-mark holder provides a product of inferior or even differing quality, 
195. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (explaining that “users that type Plaintiff’s website address into their browsers are clearly 
attempting to access Plaintiff’s website because of prior knowledge of that website, knowledge 
that is dependent on Plaintiff’s reputation and goodwill”). 
196. See U-Haul Int’l, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d at 725 (stating that “[t]he average computer user 
who conducts a web search for the U-Haul website would expect the U-Haul website to appear 
on their computer screen”). 
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reduces the goodwill in the mark and lessens the mark’s potential for providing 
efficient information to customers.197 The likelihood of confusion test 
determines whether consumers could be under a misimpression about the 
mark’s source and assigns liability accordingly. But the likelihood of confusion 
test only applies to acts that are deemed “uses.”  When actions by non-mark 
holders that have the potential to reduce a mark’s signaling power are excluded 
from the definition of “use,” and hence excluded from likelihood of confusion 
analysis, the incentives for investment in trademark decrease.  If “use” is 
defined to include those occasions when a non-mark holder attempts to trade on 
public goodwill in a mark, then infringement law will foster investment in 
marks by giving mark holders the knowledge that attempts by others to trade 
on the goodwill in their marks will be actionable even if the mark is not used 
to identify a particular source. 
2. A Definition of “Use” Based on Trading on Goodwill Does Not 
Require Plenary Protection 
The proposed definition does not require a radical reworking of trademark 
law.  The law already recognizes that mere “technical” or “mechanical” use of 
a mark should not trigger an infringement claim.198  What the definition does 
contribute is the basis for making a principled distinction between technical and 
nontechnical use.  In the U-Haul case, the court attempted to equate domain 
name registration with the use of software to trigger pop-up advertisements 
based on trademarked keywords. The court found that both situations involved 
use of a trademark only for its “pure machine-linking function.”199  Under the 
proposed definition, a technical use such as registering a domain name would 
not be considered a “use” because the defendant has not done anything to trade 
on the goodwill in the mark.  A domain name registrar simply performs a 
mechanical task that is the same regardless of the domain name being 
registered.200  But the U-Haul court’s analysis of the “pure machine-linking 
function” of pop-up software is inappropriate.  Rather than performing a 
mechanical act, the pop-up software provider trades on mark goodwill by 
selecting particular marks as keyword triggers based on their signaling power. 
This is the same as Google’s decision to sell advertising based on the value of 
197. See Landes & Posner, supra note 108, at 280 (“Without an exclusive right to use one’s 
own trademark, a firm that was producing a lower-quality brand might attempt to free ride on 
firms producing higher-quality brands by duplicating their trademarks and hoping that 
consumers would be misled into believing the brands were equivalent.”). 
198. See supra Part II.B.2.b. 
199. U-Haul Int’l, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d at 728. 
200. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 953 (C.D. 
Cal. 1996) (stating that the registrar “does not make an independent determination of an 
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particular trademarked keywords.  Unlike the domain name registrar, Google 
and the pop-up advertiser are trading directly off of the mark’s goodwill, that 
is, the signaling power in the mark.201  The proposed definition makes this 
distinction more clear, preventing any tendency to define “technical” use as 
merely use in a complex or technological way. 
A definition of “use” based on attempts to trade on the goodwill in a mark 
is not the same as a blanket proscription on freeriding and should not lead to 
concerns of propertization. First, the proposed definition does not require a ban 
on every attempt to exploit mark goodwill.  Under the likelihood of confusion 
test, which applies to every allegation of trademark infringement, attempts to 
trade on goodwill are not actionable unless they are likely to confuse the 
consuming public.202  Thus, even if “use” is defined more broadly than use of 
a trademark as a source identifier, no defendant would be liable for 
infringement under this definition unless its use had the potential to increase 
consumer search costs. 
Second, an attempt to trade on goodwill would only be deemed a “use” if it 
could have the effect of eroding the mark holder’s goodwill.203  A use that 
leaves the mark holder’s investment in goodwill intact would not be actionable 
as infringement.204  Goodwill can only be threatened if the consumer is unable 
to determine who is making use of the mark.  For example, repairers of 
trademarked goods routinely refer to trademarks to describe the nature of their 
201. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 25:70.1 (maintaining that by triggering banner 
advertising to keyword trademarks, “the portals and search engines are taking advantage of the 
drawing power and goodwill of these famous marks”). 
202. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). 
203. It has already been recognized in the case law that “so long as the goodwill built up by 
the trademark owner is not eroded by being identified with inferior quality, the Lanham Act 
does not prevent the truthful use of trademarks.”  Nitro Leisure Prods., LLC v. Acushnet Co., 
341 F.3d 1356, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
204. In addition to infringement, the Lanham Act also makes actionable “dilution,” defined 
as “the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark” by a subsequent user of the mark. 15 
U.S.C. § 1127.  Dilution serves to protect mark goodwill, but it is not a substitute for 
infringement law because of several key differences between the two doctrines. First, anti-
dilution law only applies to famous marks. See Avery Denison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 
868, 875 (9th Cir. 1999).  Second, actual injury is required as opposed to the mere likelihood 
of injury required under infringement law. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 
418, 432-34 (2003).  Third, dilution requires “commercial use” as opposed to “use.”  H.R. REP. 
NO. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031 (explaining that the 
commercial use requirement requires commercial speech, i.e., speech that proposes a 
commercial transaction).  Finally, unlike infringement law, the tort of dilution may apply even 
when there is no confusion as to source.  See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 
903 (9th Cir. 2002) (“By contrast to trademark infringement, the injury from dilution usually 
occurs when consumers aren’t confused about the source of a product.”); Barnes & Laky, supra 
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business.  Even when the repair company is not affiliated with the company 
owning the trademark, the Lanham Act cannot be used to prevent repair shops 
from informing consumers that they provide this service.205  Repair of a  
trademarked good followed by a return of the good to its owner is not a “use” 
of a trademark because the owner does not expect to receive its good back from 
the mark holder; she expects only to get goods of repaired quality.206  A repairer 
that identifies itself as a repairer does not erode the signaling power of the mark. 
Instead, it is simply describing its own services and happens to be incidentally 
profiting from the popularity of the plaintiff’s mark.207 
Third, the law recognizes that some uses of trademark, even if they have the 
potential for confusing consumers, should be permitted.208  Although the 
proposed definition of “use” is more expansive than the source identifier 
approach, it has built-in limitations that will continue to permit information 
distribution consonant with the goals of trademark law. Under the proposed 
definition, the alleged infringer must take some action based on a re-creation of 
the plaintiff’s mark in order for there to be “use.”  Take, for example, a 
defendant caught passing out leaflets for Store B in front of Store A. Store B is 
profiting off of consumer goodwill towards Store A as Store B intercepts 
shoppers traveling to Store A based on their prior knowledge of Store A’s 
205. See Nitro Leisure Prods., LLC, 341 F.3d at 1361-62; Karl Storz Endoscopy-Am., Inc. 
v. Surgical Techs., Inc., 285 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2002); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft 
v. Church, 411 F.2d 350, 352 (9th Cir. 1969); U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Orris, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 
1201, 1209 (D. Kan. 1998). 
206. Karl Storz Endoscopy-Am., 285 F.3d at 855. 
207. Nitro Leisure Prods., LLC, 341 F.3d at 1362 (explaining that “the Lanham Act does not 
prevent the truthful use of trademarks, even if such use results in the enrichment of others”). 
However, if the repairs are so extensive that the good really becomes a different product from 
the trademarked good, then there has been a sale that will be considered a “use” under the 
Lanham Act. See Karl Storz Endoscopy-Am., 285 F.3d at 856.  In such a situation, the 
reconstructed product would still bear the original manufacturer’s trademark yet would be a 
different product from the one originally manufactured.  Sale of a reconstructed product 
constitutes use of the trademark’s signaling power because “downstream consumers” will 
potentially be “deceived about the [repaired good’s] origin.”  Id. at 855.  “The repair company 
in that situation is trading on the goodwill of, or association with, the trademark holder.” Id. 
at 856.  In other words, there would be an actionable “use” because the repair company, by 
rebuilding the good yet not noting the alteration, is re-creating the mark and causing a situation 
where future consumers could be confused as to the real maker of the product. 
208. See KP Permanent Make-Up Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 542, 550 
(2004) (holding that some possibility of consumer confusion about the origin of the goods or 
services affected is compatible with fair use of a mark); Application of Deister Concentrator 
Co., 289 F.2d 496, 504 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (explaining that “[a] certain amount of purchaser 
confusion may even be tolerable in order to give the public the advantages of free 
competition”); see also Kratzke, supra note 116, at 266 (“Not all information has equal value, 
and not all confusion raises search costs or causes a misallocation of resources.”). 
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reputation.  Nevertheless, Store B’s conduct should be permitted as it provides 
an alternate source of consumer information without harming the informational 
signaling power of Store A’s mark.209  The proposed definition screens out Store 
B’s conduct from trademark analysis by requiring that the alleged infringer take 
some action based on a re-creation of the plaintiff’s mark.210  Here, there is no 
re-creation of the Store A mark.  All Store B is doing is using its own corporate 
name to advertise for its own store.  On the other hand, if those passing out the 
leaflets for Store B wore jackets emblazoned with a re-creation of Store A’s 
mark, then there would be an actionable “use” under the proposed definition. 
The “use” test proposed here does not require that the re-creation of the mark 
be an attempt to label the defendant’s own goods, but it does require some 
action employing the actual mark as a signal to draw in consumers.  In the 
Google cases and in other cases of keyword search advertising, this requirement 
is satisfied when consumers type a trademarked term into their search engine 
window. Google uses that re-creation, which is based on the goodwill the 
consumer holds in the mark, to trigger advertisements.  Unlike the source 
identifier definition, the proposed definition of “use” makes Google’s conduct 
actionable even if Google has not re-created the mark itself and used it as a 
brand.  The mark re-creation requirement provides clarity. It tells a business 
when its conduct could be considered a “use” and allows it to advertise without 
worrying if its actions will be deemed an actionable effort to trade on a mark’s 
goodwill. 
3. The Special Nature of the Internet Calls for a More Expansive 
Definition of “Use” 
The proposed definition is necessary to deal with the challenges brought on 
by trademark use on the Internet.  Online commerce has resulted in a host of 
different advertising techniques whereby the input of a particular search term 
triggers certain Internet content but the trademarked term is never displayed. 
Trademarked search terms produce pop-up ads211 and banner advertising.212 
209. Cf. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J., concurring) (explaining that infringement law should recognize the 
difference between “hijacking” consumers and presenting consumers with recognizable 
choices). 
210. Note the definition of “use” proposed in this article would only apply to claims of 
infringement.  Claims of unfair competition can be based on false or misleading descriptions 
or representations of fact and do not require that a defendant “use” the plaintiff’s trademark. 
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2000); Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 877 (6th Cir. 2002). 
211. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text. Gator Corporation, now known as Claria 
Corporation, and WhenU.com are the two main sources of online pop-up advertising. See Note, 
Confusion in Cyberspace: Defending and Recalibrating the Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2387-88 (2004); see also Jason Allen Cody, Just WhenU Thought It 
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Competitors embed their rivals’ trademarks into the internal code of their 
websites, causing the non-mark holder’s website to appear in a list of search 
results for the trademarked term.213  Google and other search engines214 charge 
a fee to trigger advertisements when a consumer inputs a trademarked term. 
The covert nature of trademark use on the Internet makes a definition of 
“use” based on the encouragement justification for trademark law particularly 
appropriate. The Internet advertising techniques described above do not fit the 
traditional definition of “use” because consumers do not witness the non-mark 
holder using the mark itself.  Under the source identifier definition of “use,” 
these practices would escape liability, even if they had the effect of confusing 
consumers, because the mark is not used to brand the defendant’s own products. 
Nevertheless, these techniques supply the same disincentives to trademark 
creation as more ordinary uses of trademark. Even if consumers cannot see the 
defendant using the mark in question, they can still be misled, and the mark 
holder’s goodwill is eroded.215 
In fact, on the Internet, the incentives are even higher for infringement, and 
correspondingly lower for investment, than in other commercial arenas.  It takes 
much more effort for a non-mark holder to create misleading labels bearing a 
trademark and physically affix them to goods than it does for the non-mark 
holder to simply install some hidden code onto its website or to pay a search 
Was All Over, Gator’s Kin Pops Up and Slides out of Dangerous IP Waters (For the Most 
Part): A Review of 2 Online Pop-Up Advertisers and 4 Internet Law Decisions, 7 PITT. J. TECH. 
LAW & POL’Y 11-12 (2004), available at http://www.pitt.edu/~sorc/techjournal/articles. html 
(describing the business practices of Gator and WhenU.com). 
212. E.g., Playboy Enters., Inc., 354 F.3d at 1020. 
213. See, e.g.2 Horphag Research Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003); 
Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 102, 104 (D. Mass. 1998). 
214. For example, the search engine Excite has been sued for infringement based on its sale 
of keyword banner advertising. See Estee Lauder, Inc. v. Fragrance Counter, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 
269, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 25:70.1, at 25-169 to -170 
(describing the case). 
215. See Playboy Enters., Inc., 354 F.3d at 1026-27 (citing evidence from Playboy’s expert 
that over fifty percent of those searching for “playboy” believed that the links accompanying 
keyword triggered banner ads were sponsored by or associated with Playboy); Rachel Jane 
Posner, Manipulative Metatagging, Search Engine Baiting, and Initial Interest Confusion, 33 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 439, 494 (2000) (“Thus, even though only the search engine reads 
the metatag, and the allegedly infringing mark remains invisible to the web user, the web user 
can still experience confusion due to the allegedly infringing mark’s effect on the search output 
list.”). But see Michael R. Sees, Note, Use of Another’s Trademark in a Web Page Meta Tag: 
Why Liability Should Not Ensue Under the Lanham Act for Trademark Infringement, 5 TEX. 
WESLEYAN L. REV. 99, 113 (1998) (“Since exposure of the trademark on the webpage does not 
occur [when a metatag is used], the likelihood of confusion of the prospective purchaser does 
not exist . . . .”). 
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engine for the rights to a trademarked search term.216  An infringer caught 
infringing through its use of one website or one search engine can turn to 
hundreds of other search engines and domain names for new websites to 
continue its infringing practices.217 Because trademark use on the Internet is 
usually hidden, consumer backlash against infringers for luring them in under 
false pretenses is less likely than in a traditional infringement case.218  If a user 
of a search engine is directed to a link for the website of a manufacturer that she 
did not want to go to, she may not know who to blame.219  It could be the fault 
of a rival manufacturer for embedding the trademarks of its competitor as 
hidden code in its website.  Alternatively, it could be the fault of the search 
engine, whether unintentionally, because of a faulty algorithm, or intentionally, 
by auctioning off the trademarked search term to the highest bidder.  Contrast 
this state of affairs with a more traditional case where an infringer has placed 
someone else’s mark on its product.  One unsatisfactory experience with the 
rival’s product gives the consumer all she needs to know to avoid that product 
in the future.  But in the case of Internet commerce, the consumer may not 
know who to blame and therefore take no action to prevent future confusion.220 
Given these incentives for infringement, “use” should be defined to make 
infringers think twice before attempting to trade on the goodwill in a mark in 
a way that has the potential to confuse consumers.  Under the proposed 
definition, all of the Internet advertising techniques described above would be 
considered “use.”  Even if the plaintiff’s trademark was never displayed to 
consumers, the definition makes it actionable for a non-mark holder to rely on 
a re-creation of a mark to trade on the mark’s goodwill. To illustrate, consider 
a non-mark holder’s use of “metatags.”  Metatags are the internal codes that 
describe the contents of a website. Consumers do not see metatags, but search 
engines can scrutinize metatags to determine which webpages are responsive 
to a particular search term.221 Metatags allow a non-mark holder to trade off of 
216. See TRADEMARK LAW & THE INTERNET 142 (Lisa E. Cristal & Neal S. Greenfield, eds., 
2001) (discussing relative ease of infringement on the Internet). 
217. See Rossi, supra note 112, at 354 (stating that there are more than 1000 search engines 
in existence). 
218. See STUART BIEGEL, BEYOND OUR CONTROL?: CONFRONTING THE LIMITS OF OUR 
LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE AGE OF CYBERSPACE 34-35 (2001) (discussing how the anonymity 
permitted by cyberspace allows some laws to be broken with impunity). 
219. See id. at 67 (explaining that online users “have more privacy because they can assume 
other identities and take advantage of the technology to maintain a certain level or anonymity 
in certain situations”). 
220. Cf. Adam S. Chinnock, Note, Meta Tags: Another Whittle from the Stick of Trademark 
Protection?, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 276 (1998) (discussing the particular difficulty in 
policing trademark infringement through metatags). 
221. Google has made metatagging less important in determining search results today. 
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consumer goodwill in a mark by using the consumer’s input of a trademarked 
search term to trigger the display of its own website in search engine results. 
For example, an adult entertainment website attempted to trade off of the 
goodwill of Playboy Enterprises by embedding the terms PLAYBOY and 
PLAYMATE in its metatags.222  The metatags engineered a misleadingly high 
search engine ranking when those terms were used in a search engine request.223 
Although use of trademarked metatags has been found actionable under the 
Lanham Act,224 some commentators argue that these cases should be dismissed 
because consumers are savvy enough not to be confused by a metatag.225 They 
contend that if consumers find themselves on Pepsi’s webpage even though 
they typed Coke into their search engines, they are smart enough to know the 
difference and move on to a different site. Similar arguments have been made 
with regard to keyword triggered banner advertising226 and pop-up ads.227 
Regardless of whether there is a likelihood of confusion when a defendant 
uses metatags or another technique relying on the consumer’s input of a 
trademarked search term, the use of a trademarked term in webpage code 
should constitute “use.”  By using the trademarked term to divert consumers 
looking for that term to a different website, the defendant relies on the 
consumer’s re-creation of the mark in her search engine window.  The 
consumer’s decision to type in that mark is based on prior knowledge of the 
mark; in other words, it is dependent on the mark’s signaling power.228  Those 
who use keyword triggered advertising like pop-up ads and Google’s 
“Sponsored Links” are trading off of the goodwill in the mark by causing their 
by the number of other sites that link or point to it. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 25:69. 
Thus, an attempt to achieve a high search ranking through the use of metatags will not work if 
the consumer is using Google.  Most of the other popular search engines have followed suit and 
changed their indexing schemes to not rely on metatags. See King, supra note 113, at 327. 
Nevertheless, the metatagging cases serve as important precedent for determining “use” in other 
disputes over Internet advertising. 
222. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220, 1221-22 (N.D. 
Cal. 1997). 
223. Id. at 1221. 
224. See Horphag Research Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003); 
Promatek Indus. Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812-13 (7th Cir. 2002); Brookfield 
Communications v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062-66 (9th Cir. 1999); Niton 
Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 102, 104 (D. Mass. 1998). 
225. See, e.g., Terrell W. Mills, METATAGS: Seeking to Evade User Detection and the 
Lanham Act, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 22, ¶¶ 26-27 (2000), at http://www.richmond.edu/ 
jolt/v6i5/article1.html; O’Rourke, supra note 140, at 294. 
226. Saunders, supra note 8, at 567. 
227. Kline, supra note 44, at 938-40. 
228. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003). 
 







     











   
   
 
 
    
   
 
219 2005] ANALYSIS OF SEARCH ENGINE ADVERTISING 
own advertisements to appear based on the consumer’s decision to type the 
mark into her search engine.  Accordingly, these actions should be considered 
“use,” and the defendants should be held liable if there is a likelihood of 
confusion and the mark is used in a way that did not constitute fair use.229  It 
may be that search engine users have grown increasingly sophisticated and no 
longer expect the websites that spring from their search engine results to always 
match the marks they typed into their search requests.230 But that is a question 
for the second stage likelihood of confusion analysis, not for the initial “use” 
analysis.231 
V. Conclusion 
Attempts by Google and others to disseminate advertising based on 
trademarked keyword search terms is big business.  The Lanham Act’s 
likelihood of confusion test is designed to prevent those uses of trademark on 
229. A metatag that is used solely to describe the defendant’s own business would be 
considered fair use. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 803-04 (9th Cir. 
2002) (Playmate of the Year who used terms “playboy” and “playmate” in her personal 
website’s metatags had engaged in nominative fair use and was not liable for infringement).
230. See 2 GILSON, supra note 181, § 7A.08 (“Search engine searches often generate 
seemingly irrelevant material and even moderately sophisticated Internet users have come to 
expect that many search results will not match what they are looking for.”); Dogan & Lemley, 
supra note 13, at 824 (“Right now, relevance-based search practices have led consumers to 
understand that search engines return hits based on relevance and not on ownership.”); Shea, 
supra note 8, at 550 (“If users decide to click on a competitor’s website, they are not confused 
into thinking it is the website of the trademark owner because they have no expectation that 
every website is related.”); see also Big Star Entm’t v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 
216 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting a particular level of sophistication among Internet users). But see 
U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 725 (E.D. Va. 2003) (stating that 
“[t]he average computer user who conducts a web search for the U-Haul website would expect 
the U-Haul website to appear on their computer screen”); Posner, supra note 215, at 494 (stating 
that whether or not computer users are “Internet-savvy enough to be immune to manipulative 
metatagging” has not been settled and requires factual proof). 
231. Note also that a company’s use of trademarks as metatags or as keyword triggers for 
advertising will not necessarily fall under fair use.  The fair use defense is only available when 
the defendant uses the mark in “good faith” and “not as a trademark.”  15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) 
(2000).  The inquiry into whether or not a defendant used a mark in good faith turns on whether 
“the defendant adopted its mark with the intention of capitalizing on plaintiff’s reputation and 
goodwill and any confusion between his and the senior user’s product.”  Lang v. Retirement 
Living Pub. Co., 949 F.2d 576, 583 (2d Cir. 1991).  By employing trademarks for their 
signaling function as a particular source of goods or services, a search engine selling keyword 
triggered advertising forfeits the fair use defense.  See Kline, supra note 44, at 937; Julie A. 
Razjer, Misunderstanding the Internet: How Courts Are Overprotecting Trademarks Used in 
Metatags, 2001 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 427, 435 (2001); Saunders, supra note 8, at 564 (stating 
that search engines that sold trademarked terms “playboy” and “playmate” as keywords to firms 
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the Internet that may fool consumers about the true source of goods and 
services.  But the Lanham Act can only achieve its purpose if “use” is defined 
broadly enough to include acts by search engines that trade on a mark’s 
goodwill, and thus allow those acts to be evaluated for likelihood of confusion. 
Under the source identifier definition of “use,” Google’s keyword triggered 
“Sponsored Links” would be left out of the infringement analysis.  Uncertainty 
in this area of law has the potential to paralyze brand creators and shift 
resources to less efficient modes of consumer communication. 
A better approach is to define “use” to include those actions that seek to trade 
on a mark’s goodwill based on some re-creation of the mark.  Such a definition 
would provide incentives for trademark creation, which are particularly 
necessary given the low cost opportunities for infringement on the Internet as 
well as the high cost of creating marks in the modern marketplace. This 
approach is not so much an expansion of the law as a clarification of already 
existing law that was unnecessary until now. Defining “use” in this manner will 
not transform trademark into an unlimited property right, but it will provide 
much needed clarity for mark holders, mark users, and consumers. 
